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Preface
The most dicult thing about doing research is to stop doing it. In parti-
cular this holds for a specic piece of work like an article or this dissertation.
There must be a moment on which it is declared nished. This is what I do
now by writing this preface. To reduce the diculty of this task, I intend
to keep on doing research after my PhD, which makes sure that it is not my
ultimate expression. Still, this ctional nish is a good opportunity to show
something of what I was doing during the last years and moreover to thank
everybody who supports me.
This dissertation reveals some insights about our networked society.
Everybody deals with communication links in everyday life, everybody is
a consumer, and almost everybody has encountered the rich environment
of the internet. This suggests that almost everyone likes to read this book
about online consumer-to-consumer communication networks. That this is
not the case is certainly due to time constraints (see Chapter 2 of this thesis).
I sincerely hope that any other reasons do not exist, for I have attempted to
write something suciently noteworthy and novel about this relevant topic.
My sincere thanks go to everybody who did invest time and eort in this
dissertation. In particular, I would like to mention my supervisors Benedict
Dellaert and Jean-Jacques Herings who merged two dierent research tradi-
tions in this project and provided a large informational value. Furthermore,
I would like to thank the members of the dissertation committee, Arno Riedl,
Els Breugelmans, and Dolf Talman, as well as the participants in the expe-
xiii
xiv 0. Preface
riment or one of its pilots, for their informational value. Also thanks to all
my teachers, colleagues and oce mates at the FEBA, who supplied a mix
of informational and social value. Moreover, I would like to thank my fa-
mily, friends, and especially my husband for the large social (and sometimes
informational!) value they gave me. Finally, it is right and just to thank
God who created and maintains all value.
Chapter 1
Introduction
This chapter introduces the dissertation’s topic (Section 1.1), perspective
(Section 1.2), and methods (Section 1.3).
1.1 Online Consumer-to-Consumer Communication
Networks
The importance of consumers is increasingly recognized in today’s society.
During the last century, the predominant business philosophy evolved from
the production concept, perceiving consumers as taken-for-granted buyers of
a rm’s product, via the selling concept, perceiving consumers as potential
buyers of a rm’s product who have to be convinced, to the marketing con-
cept, perceiving consumers as individuals with needs that a rm’s product
should satisfy. More recently, consumers are even often perceived as active
partners in a rm’s production process, since they are specialized in their
own preferences and after buying in using the product (Von Hippel 1998).
A prevailing way in which consumers can perform this active role is by
communicating with other consumers. By exchanging experiences with a
1
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product, consumers do not only help themselves and each other, but they
simultaneously help the rm if it is suciently knowledge-oriented and e-
xible (Prahalad and Ramaswamy 2000). Evidently, by helping each other
consumers reduce the rm’s product support costs. Additionally, they pro-
vide the rm with insider feedback that is useful for product improvement
and they develop and promote a more favorable attitude towards the pro-
duct (Wiertz 2005). Thus, consumer and rm welfare are highly related in
this context.
It has been acknowledged in the social sciences (Wellman and Berkowitz
1988) and particularly in marketing (Iacobucci 1996) that human behavior
should be studied from a structure or network perspective, because it is
aected not only by individual entities such as rm, consumer or house-
hold, or even dyads such as buyer-seller or consumer-consumer, but also
by the entire pattern of relationships among multiple actors. Therefore, in
this dissertation we deal with the relevant topic of consumer-to-consumer
communication in the form of networks.
A growingly popular version of such a network is the online consumer-
to-consumer communication network (OCCN). Online, consumers are more
exible to choose their communication partners based on shared interest
than oine, for they are less constrained by existing acquaintance structures.
Also, it is much easier for a rm to gain insight from and even inuence on
the communication among consumers, which is necessary to optimally reap
the benets of it. Several diverse examples of OCCNs are illustrated at the
cover of this book and listed in Table 1.1.
Communication in OCCNs is prominently characterized by the fact that
it provides two distinct categories of value and thus motivation for parti-
cipants: informational value, which is based on the exchange of product-
related knowledge, and social value, which is based on the enjoyment of
interaction (e.g., Dholakia et al. 2004). Furthermore, a prominent charac-
teristic of OCCNs, which has been largely neglected by the literature, is the
fact that there are also costs involved for participants, for they have to spend
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OCCN URL (d.d. 09-30-2008)
c++ http://www.gidforums.com/f-28.html
countries travel http://www.virtual-countries-travel.com
ellegirl http://forum.ellegirl.nl
ford http://www.ford-world.nl
health http://www.healthboards.com
hp http://forums.itrc.hp.com
hyves http://www.hyves.nl
parenting http://www.iparenting.com
jong katholiek http://www.jongkatholiek.nl
pussokram http://www.csc.kth.se/~pholme/
presentations/slides/doksem.pdf
Table 1.1: Examples of OCCNs
time and eort to maintain their communication links with other members:
in the rst half of 2008, an average consumer spent 37% of her online time on
communication, the other categories being commerce, content, and search
(Internet Activity Index1).
1.2 An Economic Exploration of their Formation
and Value
Since its short existence, the marketing literature on this topic has mainly fo-
cused on the question why individuals choose to participate in and contribute
to online communities (e.g., Bagozzi and Dholakia 2006, Wiertz 2005) and
until now disregarded the particulars of these so-called “webs of personal
relationships in cyberspace” (Rheingold 2000, p.2)). Yet, structures of who
communicates with whom can be empirically observed (e.g., Holme et al.
2004, Fisher et al. 2006) and aect outcomes such as the extent to which
value is shared throughout the network and how it is distributed (e.g., Gra-
novetter 2005, Ren et al. 2007). These are important variables since they
1http://www.online-publishers.org/page.php/prmID/421, retrieved on September,
11th 2008
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determine how benecial OCCNs are for consumers as well as rms.
The economics discipline studies human choices on scarce commodities
as means to achieve ends (Robbins 1932). As mentioned before, consumer-
to-consumer communication is costly (scarcity) and its structure is an im-
portant determinant of value (end), so consumers’ choices in the formation
of a communication network perfectly t in the eld of economics. Since
marketing is a multidisciplinary science, grounding its consumer behavior
theories on sociology, anthropology, philosophy, psychology, and economics,
it is striking that the economic perspective on OCCN formation is clearly
lacking in the existing marketing literature.
The current dissertation aims at lling this gap by initiating an economic
exploration of the formation and value of OCCNs. To diversify our learning,
we focus on distinct but highly interwoven aspects: (i) the strategic aspect,
where participants choose to create links based on a cost-benet tradeo
when the eects of these choices also depend on others’ choices, and (ii) the
behavioral aspect, where the complexity of the network setting can inuence
the mental decision rules that individual participants use for link formation.
1.3 Methods and Outline
1.3.1 The Strategic Aspect
To model the network formation process in its strategic aspect, we use the
economic tool for studying strategic interactions, i.e., game theory. This
sub-discipline intends to mathematically capture situations where decision-
makers can freely base their choices on the alternatives’ costs and benets,
which also depend on the choices of other decision-makers. Recently, a
game-theoretic literature stream is developing that is focusing on network
formation, conceptualized as a process in which individuals choose to create
and maintain links if the participants in the link benet from doing so, which
results in a stable network structure (e.g., Bala and Goyal 2000, Jackson and
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Wolinsky 1996). Although these models are very appropriate if applied to
an online setting, this has not been done before.
For this application, we incorporate the mentioned benet- and cost-
related characteristics of OCCNs in our game-theoretical model of network
formation. We are rst to distinguish between social and informational value
as motivations for bilateral exchange decisions,2 where informational value
can be transferred relatively easily to third parties through indirect links,
whereas social value is more individual and therefore not transferable. More-
over, we introduce link specicity in the communication context, meaning
that the more direct connections an individual has to maintain with other
individuals, the less she is able to specify her attention per link within her
total time available. Therefore, her additive value per link for others declines
and she also derives less additive value from each link with others (Currarini
2007, Jackson and Wolinsky 1996).
Our game-theoretic model is presented in Chapter 2 of this dissertation.
For homogeneous participants and a xed level of link specicity, the model
predicts which network structures emerge dependent on the level of focus
on informational versus social value in the community. We rst characterize
the set of stable structures in the case with only social value to indicate the
separate impact of link specicity and demonstrate that it includes a wide
range of non-standard architectures. Then in the case with both social and
informational value, the joint eect of link specicity and value transferabi-
lity is shown to reduce the stable set to fragmented architectures consisting
of small star components. Finally, the best and worst stable structures from
a welfare point of view are described and the role of the relative community
focus on informational versus social value is illustrated.
In Chapter 3, the model is generalized as to allow for heterogeneous
participants and a variable level of link specicity. By simulations, we show
which networks emerge for three levels of link specicity, three levels of focus
2Note that the marketing literature as mentioned before only considered these value
categories as motivations to actively participate in OCCNs in general.
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on informational versus social value from communication, and four valuation
patterns: homogeneity and expertise heterogeneity, each with and without
the presence of one especially highly valued expert. It is illustrated that the
structure properties of these networks heavily depend on these parameter
values, which results in eciency and equity dierences among settings.
Accordingly, we assess the eectivity of several managerial tools for OCCNs.
For example, we nd that the eects of an expert in a community depend
on whether the rest of the community is homogeneous or not. Also, when
the informational and social aspects of communication are equally valued,
more focus on informational value turns out to be benecial for community
welfare. Finally, enhancing communication in the community by decreasing
link specicity does not always lead to higher welfare from communication.
1.3.2 The Behavioral Aspect
To investigate the individual link choice process in its behavioral aspect, we
use an experimental economics approach. This branch studies choices by
having people make them in a controlled laboratory environment, where the
consequences of these choices are paid out to participants in monetary terms.
There exists a very recent and increasing literature in which researchers
experimentally investigate the network formation process (e.g., Callander
and Plott 2005, Deck and Johnson 2004). These studies are all involved
with the strategic aspect of network formation, whereas we exclude this
aspect in order to be able to better examine the behavioral aspect, since the
eects of both aspects can be entangled.
For our inquiry how the complexity of the network setting can inuence
the mental decision rules that participants use for link formation, we combine
the experimental economics approach with an individual choice modeling
approach as known from the discipline of choice analysis (McFadden 2001,
Hensher et al. 2005). It allows us to investigate the impact of important
network properties on decisions without having to make strong assumptions
about the strategic interplay among heterogeneous, noisy decision-makers.
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Chapter 4 describes our experiment and its results, demonstrating that
individuals systematically simplify more complex components of network
payo in their linking decisions. Specically, they focus on only part of the
normative payo, namely on their own, direct payo, and tend to ignore
indirect payo and payo for others in the network. Additionally, individu-
als use descriptive behavioral traits of link choice alternatives to guide their
choices: they are sensitive to whether an alternative involves link deletion
or creation and whether it concerns an isolated or a central node. Fur-
thermore, we nd that complexity of one type can moderate individuals’
dealing with a complex feature of another type. These behavioral eects
have important implications for researchers and managers working in areas
that involve network formation.
1.3.3 Outline
In Figure 1.1, the topic, perspective, and methods of this dissertation are
summarized.
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Figure 1.1: Dissertation Summary
Chapter 2
The Strategic Aspect:
A Game-Theoretical Model
We analyze the structure of bilateral communication links among consumers
in virtual communities by a game-theoretic model of network formation.
First, link specicity is incorporated, meaning that the more direct links
somebody has to maintain with others, the less she is able to specify her
attention per link within her time available, so that the value of her links de-
creases. Second, a distinction is made between the social and informational
value from communication, where informational value is transferable via in-
direct links, whereas social value is not. We characterize the set of pairwise
stable structures in the case with only social value to indicate the separate
impact of link specicity and demonstrate that it includes a wide range of
non-standard architectures. In the case with both social and informational
value, the joint eect of link specicity and value transferability is shown to
reduce the pairwise stable set to fragmented architectures consisting of small
star components. Finally, we describe the best and worst stable structures
from a welfare point of view and illustrate the role of the relative community
focus on informational versus social value.
9
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2.1 Introduction
Websites such as www.healthboards.com, www.ediets.com/community/, and
www.saabnet.com allow a growing number of consumers to easily commu-
nicate with like-minded individuals based on shared interests around for
example products, consumption activities, or personal conditions. Hence,
these communication forums are also increasingly valuable for suppliers,
since they are media for word-of-mouth and consumer co-production (e.g.,
Algesheimer et al. 2005, Dellarocas 2003, Hagel and Armstrong 1997).
Compared to the oine world, consumers in these online communities
are relatively exible to choose their communication partners, since by ope-
rating online they are less constrained by geographical distance and by exis-
ting social networks, like family structures (Wellman et al. 1996, Van Al-
styne and Brynjolfsson 2005). The virtual community literature until now
has mainly focused on the question why individuals choose to participate
in and contribute to online communities (e.g., Bagozzi and Dholakia 2006,
McLure Wasko and Faraj 2005) and disregarded the particulars of these
so-called “webs of personal relationships in cyberspace” (Rheingold 2000,
p.2)). Yet, structures of who communicates with whom are distinguishing
empirical phenomena (e.g., Holme et al. 2004, Fisher et al. 2006) and can
determine important outcome variables such as the extent to which value is
shared throughout the network and how it is distributed (e.g., Granovetter
2005, Ren et al. 2007).
In the current chapter we do study the structure of the bilateral commu-
nication links within online consumer communities, to which we therefore
refer as Online Consumer Communication Networks (OCCNs). We model
their formation as a game-theoretic network formation process in which in-
dividuals choose to create and maintain links, only if the participants in the
link benet from doing so, which results in a pairwise stable network struc-
ture (Jackson and Wolinsky 1996). Thus, this chapter illustrates how to
use the rich game-theoretic literature on network formation (e.g., Bala and
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Goyal 2000, Jackson and Wolinsky 1996) can be used in an applied setting.
Recently studied other settings are rm collaboration (e.g., Goyal and Joshi
2003, Belleamme and Bloch 2004) and crime networks (Calvó-Armengol
and Zenou 2004). We demonstrate that our online consumer communica-
tion setting is an appealing application area.
We introduce the important distinction between social and informational
value as motivations for bilateral exchange decisions. This typology was
suggested by the virtual community literature regarding the question why
individuals choose to participate in and contribute to such a community
as a whole (e.g., Dholakia et al. 2004). Social value is related to the fact
that individuals may simply enjoy communicating with others, for exam-
ple because they nd it entertaining or because they feel it enhances their
self-worth (e.g., Hennig-Thurau et al. 2004). Informational value refers
to the fact that consumers may obtain new valuable knowledge from other
consumers when they communicate online. Typically, informational value
can be transferred relatively easily to third parties through indirect links,
whereas social value is even more personal and therefore hardly transferable
(without creating a direct link). This transferability is more prominent in
online than in oine communication since information can be more easily
forwarded to others (Wellman et al. 1996).
To analyze the underlying structure of OCCNs we develop a model for
the formation of links that allows us to understand the relative impact of
social and informational member orientation on the emerging network struc-
tures. We incorporate a combination of two important aspects common to
OCCNs that has not been investigated before. First, our model features link
specicity in the sense that the more direct connections an individual has to
maintain with other individuals, the less she is able to specify her attention
per link within her total time available. Therefore, her additive value per
link for others declines and she also derives less additive value from each link
with others (Currarini 2007, Jackson and Wolinsky 1996). Second, we rea-
lize that when the value derived from communication is not only social but
also contains an informational component, this is transferable via indirect
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links (Bala and Goyal 2000).
More specically, we rst deal with the case of communication having
social value only (Section 2.2) in order to illustrate the separate impact of
link specicity on network structure. The set of pairwise stable structures
is characterized by two simple conditions and is shown to contain a wide
range of non-standard architectures, including highly connected and “small
world” structures, whereas previous models for social and economic network
formation mostly predicted simple architectures like stars and wheels.
Next, we deal with the case of communication from which both social
and informational value is derived (Section 2.3) in order to illustrate the
impact of value transferability on structure. Only structures that consist of
disjoint star components of two or three agents are shown to be pairwise
stable. Apparently, the combination of these two features: link specicity,
which is an example of a negative network externality, and informational
value transferability, which is an example of a positive network externality
(Asvanund et al. 2004), has a strong fragmentizing eect on the emerging
pairwise stable network structures.
Subsequently, Section 2.4 characterizes the best and worst pairwise sta-
ble network structures from a welfare point of view. It follows that a mix of
social and informational focus is better than a purely social focus. There-
fore, the familiar tension between stability and eciency (e.g., Jackson and
Wolinsky 1996) can be diminished by introducing value transferability into
a setting with link specicity. We also provide further guidelines for when
it is better to stimulate either the social or the informational orientation of
an OCCN. Section 2.5 concludes and oers directions for further research.
2.2 Social Value
Although we believe that OCCNs typically combine social and informational
value aspects in their communication, we rst deal with the simpler case in
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which only social value is derived from communication. This approach al-
lows us to illustrate the separate impact of link specicity on structure and
welfare. Link specicity (Currarini 2007, Jackson and Wolinsky 1996) im-
plies that the more direct connections an individual has to maintain with
other individuals, the less she is able to specify her attention per link within
her total time available. Therefore, her additive value per link for others
declines and she also derives less additive value from each link with others.
These negative externalities of link formation are crucial in our communi-
cation context, since here no benets arise from individual contributions
as such. The reason is that communication is only valuable if it is two-
sided, thus time and eort have to be invested by both sender and receiver.1
The objective of this section therefore is to develop a model for network
formation in OCCNs with only social value from communication. We also
propose an appropriate stability concept and the large category of stable
network structures is characterized.2
2.2.1 Model
Consider a community of agents  = {1  }    3. A direct link 
between agents i and j in this community ( 	   ;  6= 	) can be interpreted
as a virtual communication relationship between i and j which is established
if they both wish the link. These relationships are expressed by undirected
links: for any two agents i and j,  =  By denition,  = 0 as agents
do not establish communication links with themselves. In this community
agents only derive social value from interaction.
In case of an isolated relationship between two agents, each agent ex-
periences social value 
 s  0 as the outcome of their joint communication
1 In contrast, in the co-author setting, which has been the subject of investigation in
earlier research (Jackson and Wolinsky 1996), each co-author can write independently as
well.
2We do recognize that next to the value derived from relationships with specic other
participants within an OCCN, participants can also derive value from the community as
a whole (cf. Ren et al. 2007). However, since this is not expected to inuence the specic
linking decisions they make, we assume it to be constant in our model.
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production process. However, maintenance of the communication relation-
ship costs eort: investment of both agents is needed in order to make the
communication specic to their personal circumstances and hence useful.
Accordingly, in case of a structure where two agents do not form an isolated
pair, both agents are assumed to divide their eort equally among all their
relationships, as a result of which the potential social communication value
is divided proportionally.
Next, we assume that the contributions of two agents in their bila-
teral process of communication value creation are equal and complementary.
Therefore, the total payo for agent i in link structure  is given by
 () =
P
()
 s
()·() if  ()  0
0 if  () = 0
(2.1)
where an element of matrix  written as  indicates with a 1 or a 0 whether
i is directly linked to j or not;  () is the set of agents with whom i has
a direct link, where agent j is a neighbor of agent i if 	   (), and
 () = | ()| is the number of neighbors of agent i, which can also be
referred to as the degree of i ; and 
 s  0 denotes the social value that
i would derive from communication with j if neither i nor j were linked
to any other agent. Observe that agents’ contributions are reected by a
Cobb-Douglas production function with unit output elasticities.3
For the model thus described stable network structures are predicted to
emerge by using the concept of pairwise stability (Jackson and Wolinsky
1996), where a network structure is stable if no single agent can strictly
improve her payo by deleting one of her direct links and no pair of agents
can strictly improve her sum of payos while each of the two members
is at least indierent by creating a direct link between the two members.
Therefore, this solution concept is weak in the sense that it only assumes
stability against deviations of exactly one link (which involves the permission
3For comparison: the payo function in the co-author model of Jackson and Wolinsky
(1996) can be written as  () =

()

 s
()
+ 
s
()
+ 
s
()·()


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of two agents in the case of link formation), reecting a form of myopia.
Alternatively, the model could be analyzed by applying the solution concept
of Nash equilibrium (Bala and Goyal 2000), which assumes stability against
single-agent deviations of more than one link. If the strategies  indicate
with a 0 or a 1 whether i wants to be directly linked to j or not and again
the actual links ¯ = min {  } are only formed if both agents want the
link, the payo function could be written as
 () =
X
(¯)

 s
 (¯) ·  (¯)

Now ¯ would be dened as a Nash network if it is supported by some  from
which no single agent can change her strategies such that she strictly im-
proves her payo. If  = 3, all possible structures would be Nash networks.
For example, the empty network would be Nash since it is supported by the
strategies  = 0 for all  	   , even though agents would obviously be-
net from changing their strategies simultaneously. Because of this extreme
coordination problem of the Nash concept in two-sided link formation and
since the weak concept of pairwise stability already clearly and interestingly
constrains the number of network structures that are stable, we choose for
the pairwise stability solution.
In our notation, we have the following denition.
Denition 1 (pairwise stability) The structure g is pairwise stable if for
all  	   with  = 1 it holds that
 ()  
¡
0
¢
and  ()  
¡
0
¢

where 0 is such that 0 = 0 and 
0
	
 = 	
 for all { } 6= { 	}, and for
all  	   with  = 0 it holds that
 ()  
¡
0
¢
or
 ()  
¡
0
¢
or
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¡
 () = 
¡
0
¢
and  () = 
¡
0
¢¢

where 0 is such that 0 = 1 and 
0
	
 = 	
 for all { } 6= { 	}.
2.2.2 Results
We prove that the class of pairwise stable network structures can be de-
scribed by two easily veriable conditions: (i) they are what we call equal
neighbor degree structures, meaning that everybody has at least one neigh-
bor and every neighbor of agent i has the same degree, and (ii) there is at
most a dierence of one between the degrees of agents in the same compo-
nent.
Denition 2 (equal neighbor degree structure) A structure g is an
equal neighbor degree structure when it holds for each agent i that  ()  1
and for all agents 	 	0   () that  () = 0 ().
Denition 3 (component) A component in a network g is a maximal set
of agents    who are connected to one another directly or indirectly, so
for each  	   there exists a sequence of agents 1        for whom
it holds that 	1 = 	1	2 =  = 	1	 = 	 = 1.
First consider the following lemma, in which the own degree of agent i
is denoted by  and her neighbors’ degree by 
Lemma 4 A structure is pairwise stable if and only if it is an equal neighbor
degree structure where it holds for each not directly linked pair of agents  	
that
   or    or ( =  + 1 and  =  + 1)  (2.2)
Proof. (=) Assume that g is an equal neighbor degree structure where for
each not directly linked pair of agents  	 condition (2.2) is satised. The
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payo of an agent  as expressed in equation (2.1) reduces to 	
 s(		)
so agent k does not want to delete a link, for
	

 s
		
 (	  1) 

s
(	  1) 	 
Moreover, no link between any pair of agents  	 is created if it makes either
i or j strictly worse o or both of them equally well o. Therefore, no link
is created if

 s

 

 s
( + 1) 
+

 s
( + 1) ( + 1)
or (2.3)

 s

 

 s
( + 1) 
+

 s
( + 1) ( + 1)
or (2.4)
Ã
 s

= 
 s
(+1)
+ 
s
(+1)(+1)
and 
s

= 
 s
(+1)
+ 
s
(+1)(+1)
!
 (2.5)
The following illustrates that    implies (2.3):
   = (+1)+  (+1)(+1) =  ( + 1) + 
( + 1) ( + 1) 

1


Analogously, it can be shown that    implies (2.4), and ( =  + 1)
and ( =  + 1) implies (2.5). Therefore, g is pairwise stable.
( = ) Assume that the structure g is pairwise stable. First, suppose
that there is an agent i for whom it holds that  () = 0. Then her payo
would strictly improve from a link with some other agent k. It is obvious
that also k ’s payo would strictly increase if 	 () = 0, which contradicts
pairwise stability, so consider the case where 	 ()  1. The payo of k
without this link equals
X
	()

 s
	 () ·  ()
=

 s
	 ()

 X
	()
1
 ()

 
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whereas by linking with i it would become
X
	()

 s
(	 () + 1) ·  ()
+

 s
(	 () + 1) · 1
=

 s
(	 () + 1)

 X
	()
1
 ()
+ 1


 

s
	 ()

 X
	()
1
 ()

 
The inequality follows from the observation that the expression before the
inequality equals 
 s times the average of the terms 1() and 1 the ex-
pression after the inequality is equal to 
 s times the average of the terms
1() and that 1  1() for all 	  () This also contradicts pair-
wise stability. It follows that  ()  1 for all    .
Secondly, suppose that for some i it does not hold that  () is constant
for all 	   (). Then there is an agent    () such that
	 () 
P
()  ()
 ()

The payo for i is given by
X
()

 s
 () ·  ()
=

 s
 ()
X
()
1
 ()

whereas by deleting the link with k, the payo for i would become
X
()

 s
( () 1) ·  ()
 

s
( () 1) · 	 ()
=

 s
( () 1)

 X
()
1
 ()
 1
	 ()




 s
 ()
X
()
1
 ()

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where the last inequality follows immediately from the interpretation of the
last two terms as 
 s times an average of numbers 1() This contradicts
pairwise stability, so  () = 0 () for all 	 	0   (). We have shown
that a pairwise stable structure is an equal neighbor degree structure.
Finally, suppose that there exists a not directly linked pair  	 for which
condition (2.2) is not satised, implying
   + 1 and    + 1 and (   + 1 or    + 1)  (2.6)
Then i and j want to create a link between them, since this would cause the
payo for agent i to become


 s
( + 1) 
+

 s
( + 1) ( + 1)
  

s
( + 1) 
+

 s
( + 1) 
=

 s


and for agent j to become


 s
( + 1) 
+

 s
( + 1) ( + 1)
  

s
( + 1) 
+

 s
( + 1) 
=

 s


where according to the last condition in (2.6) at least one of the  - signs is
strict. This contradicts pairwise stability as well. Therefore, g is an equal
neighbor degree structure with
   or    or ( =  + 1 and  =  + 1)
for each not directly linked pair of agents  	.
Condition (2.2) in Lemma 4 can be further simplied as is shown in the
following proposition.
Proposition 5 A structure is pairwise stable if and only if it is an equal
neighbor degree structure where it holds for each pair of agents   in the
same component that
|	  
|  1 (2.7)
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Proof. Considering Lemma 4, it is sucient to show that in an equal
neighbor degree structure condition (2.2) holds for each not directly linked
pair  	 if and only if condition (2.7) is satised for each pair   in the same
component.
(=) Assume an equal neighbor degree structure where for each pair
  in the same component condition (2.7) is satised. Let  	 be any not
directly linked pair. If    , condition (2.2) is satised. If not, then
   and we can derive by applying condition (2.7) twice that
   + 1     + 1
If   , condition (2.2) is satised. If not, then  = +1 and condition
(2.2) is satised if it also holds that  = +1. Suppose not, then   +2
and we can derive by applying condition (2.7) that
   + 2  (  1) + 2 =  + 2
which contradicts condition (2.7). Therefore, condition (2.2) is satised.
( = ) Assume an equal neighbor degree structure where for each not
directly linked pair  	 condition (2.2) is satised. Let   be any pair in the
same component. There exists at least one path between k and l. Assume
that the number of other agents on any of these paths is odd. Due to the
equal neighbor degree structure it holds that
	 = 
 and 	 = 

so condition (2.7) is satised. Assume that the number of other agents
on all of these paths is even. If the component consists of only  and 
then condition (2.7) trivially holds. Otherwise, there either exists an agent
  
 ()   6=  or there exists an agent   	 ()   6=  Without
loss of generality, assume the former is the case. Since all paths between 
and  have an even number of other agents, it follows that  is not directly
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linked to  Due to the equal neighbor degree structure it holds that
	 = ,  = 	,  = 
, and 
 = 
Suppose that condition (2.7) is not satised, so without loss of generality:

  	 + 2
Then it follows that
	   + 2 and   	 + 2,
which contradicts condition (2.2) for . Consequently, condition (2.7) is
satised.
The following examples illustrate the wide range of structures thus proven
to be pairwise stable in the social value case.
Denition 6 (complete structure) A structure g is complete if all agents
are connected, so for all  	   it holds that  = 1.
Denition 7 (wheel structure) A structure g is a wheel if it has exactly
n links and there exists a sequence of dierent agents 1     for
whom it holds that 	1	2 = 	2	3 =  = 	
1	
 = 	
	1 = 1.
Denition 8 (regular structure) A structure g is regular if it exists of
one component and for each agent    it holds that  = 
Corollary 9 The complete, wheel, or any regular structure is pairwise sta-
ble, for it is an equal neighbor degree structure where it holds for each pair
of agents   in the single component that
|	  
| = 0  1
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Example 10 A non-regular structure that is pairwise stable is given in Fi-
gure 2.1.
Figure 2.1: A Non-Regular Pairwise Stable Structure (Without Informa-
tional Value)
Example 11 A structure consisting of multiple components that is pairwise
stable is given in Figure 2.2.
Example 12 A “small world” is a structure with local clusters of highly
interlinked agents together with agents that link the various clusters. As a
consequence, although most agents are not directly connected, every agent is
indirectly linked to every other agent by a relatively small number of steps.
A “small world” structure that is pairwise stable is given in Figure 2.3.
Note that this wide set of stable structures includes complex real-life ar-
chitectures (e.g., Dodds et al. 2003), whereas previous models for social and
economic network formation mostly predicted simple architectures like stars
and wheels (e.g., Bala and Goyal 2000, Goyal and Vega-Redondo 2007).4
4Our results also dier with respect to the co-author model (Jackson and Wolinsky
1996) as this predicts that a pairwise stable structure can be partitioned into fully in-
traconnected components, each of which has a dierent number of members. If 1 is
the number of members of one such component and 2 is the next largest in size, then
1  (2)
2.
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Figure 2.2: A Multiple-Component Pairwise Stable Structure (Without In-
formational Value)
2.3 Informational as well as Social Value
This section introduces the case in which both social and informational
value is derived from communication in OCCNs. Thus, we can illustrate the
impact of value transferability on structure and welfare along with the eect
of link specicity. Value transferability (Bala and Goyal 2000) means that
value from communication is not only derived by direct neighbors, but can
also be transferred via indirect links. More specically, we make a distinction
between social and informational value derived from communication, where
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Figure 2.3: A “Small World” Pairwise Stable Structure (Without Informa-
tional Value)
only informational value is transferable through the network. For example,
social value from communication between two Saab enthusiasts only exists
for the two communication partners, but informational value (e.g., from a
solution to a technical problem) can (partly) exist for others in the network.
After proposing a model for network formation in this setting, the pairwise
stable network structures are characterized again. We show that the set
of stable structures is much more limited in range than in the social value
setting.
2.3.1 Model
Consider a community of agents  = {1     }    3. A direct link 
between agents i and j in this community ( 	   ;  6= 	) can be interpreted
as a virtual communication relationship between i and j which is established
if they both wish the link. These relationships are expressed by undirected
links: for any two agents i and j,  =  and  = 0
In case of an isolated relationship between two agents where interaction
only has social value, each agent experiences social value 
 s  0 as the
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outcome of their joint communication production process. In case of an
isolated relationship between two agents where interaction only has infor-
mational value, each agent experiences informational value 
 i  0 as the
outcome of their joint communication production process. In general, agents
are assumed to give relative attention to informational and social value in
the proportions  and 1 respectively, where  is assumed to be constant
satisfying 0    15
Maintenance of the communication relationship between two agents re-
quires bilateral eort investment in order to make the communication spe-
cic and hence useful. Accordingly, in case of a structure where two agents
do not form an isolated pair, both agents are assumed to divide their eort
equally among all their relationships, as a result of which the potential in-
formational as well as social communication value is divided proportionally.
We assume that the contributions of two agents in their communication
value creation are equal and complementary.
Moreover, informational value is, without any decay except for this eort
division, transferred to third parties through indirect links (paths of links),
whereas social value is not transferable. This is due to the fact that in the
direct communication production process of two agents, any of them can use
the informational value that she acquired during the bilateral communica-
tion creation with other neighbors. Consequently, agent 	0 experiences not
only rst-step informational payo from her direct neighbors:
1i0() =
X
10 ()

 i
0 () · 1 ()

which is similar to the social payo in equation (2.1), but also second-step
5The results in the case where the value derived from communication is only informa-
tional ( = 1) slightly dier from those in this mixed case (0    1). Specically, it
appears that structures also containing one four-agent star component can be pairwise
stable.
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informational payo:
2i0() =
X
10 ()
1
0 () · 1 ()
X
21 ()\0

 i
1 () · 2 ()

third-step informational payo:
3i0() =
X
10 ()
1
0 () · 1 ()
X
21()\0
1
1 () · 2 ()
X
32 ()\10

 i
2 () · 3 ()

and so forth. Thus, the overall informational payo received by agent 	0 is
equal to
i0() =
1X
=1
i0()
= 
 i
1X
=1
Y
=1
X
1 ()\230
1
1 () ·  ()
=
1X
=1
X
=1
X
1()\230

 i
0 () ·
1Q
=1
¡
 ()
¢2 ·  ()

Therefore, the total payo for agent i in link structure  is given by
 () =

	

P
¯()
P
P()
 i
()·

	 
(	())
2·()
+(1 )P()  s()·()
if  ()  0
0 if  () = 0
(2.8)
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where an element of matrix  written as  indicates with a 1 or a 0 whether
i is directly linked to j or not;  is the proportion of communication through
each link in the community that concerns product-, service- or rm-related
information and 1 is the proportion of communication through each link
in the community that concerns social interaction;  () is the set of agents
with whom i has a direct link, where agent j is a neighbor of agent i if
	   (), and  () = | ()| is the number of neighbors of agent i, which
can also be referred to as the degree of i, and ¯ () is the set of agents with
whom i has either a direct or an indirect link; P () is the set of paths
between i and j, where a path is dened as a sequence of consecutive edges
without repeated nodes, and  is the set of agents on path p between i and
j excluding i and j themselves; and 
 i  0 denotes the informational value
that i would derive from communication with j if neither i nor j were linked
to any other agent and interaction would only have informational value, and

 s  0 denotes the social value that i would derive from communication
with j if neither i nor j were linked to any other agent and interaction would
only have social value.
For the model thus described stable network structures are again pre-
dicted to emerge by using the concept of pairwise stability (Jackson and
Wolinsky 1996).
2.3.2 Results
It can be proven that the pairwise stable structures consist of small star
components.
Denition 13 (star) A structure g is a star if it has exactly 1 links and
there exists an agent j for whom it holds that  = 1 for all  6= 	. Similarly,
a component C is a star if it has exactly ||  1 links and it contains an
agent j for whom it holds that  = 1 for any other   . Agent j is called
the center agent whereas the other agents are the periphery agents of the
star.
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First consider the following lemma in which it is shown that the star
structure becomes unstable when there are more than three agents.
Lemma 14 The star structure is pairwise stable if and only if  = 3.
Proof. From the star structure, it is not benecial for any of the periphery
agents to delete her link with the center agent as then her payo will be
zero. For the center agent, deleting a link with any of the periphery agents
will provide her with the same payo. To verify this result, it is crucial to
observe that the center agent is not involved in any indirect links to other
agents in star structures. Periphery agent i does not create a link with
another periphery agent i’ if and only if

 i
μ
1
 1 +
( 2)
( 1)2
¶
+ (1 )
 s 1
 1 

 i
μ
1
2 ( 1) +
1
8 ( 1) +
1
4
+
1
4 ( 1)2 +
( 3)
2 ( 1)2 +
( 3)
8 ( 1)2
¶
+(1 )
 s
μ
1
2 ( 1) +
1
4
¶
 
 i (4 ) + (1 )
 s (3 )  0    3
Since we assumed societies to consist of at least three agents, it holds that
 = 3.
Now the following proposition can be proven.
Proposition 15 A structure is pairwise stable if and only if it consists of
disjoint star components of two or three agents.
Proof. (=) It is not benecial for any of the periphery agents in a star
component to delete her single link as then her payo will be zero. Equiva-
lently, for the center agent in a three-agent component, deleting a link with
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any of the two periphery agents is not benecial as it will provide her with
the same payo.
Link creation between the periphery agents of one three-agent star is
eliminated by Lemma 14. Therefore, we only have to examine the following
cases () ():
2 3c 3p
2 (pair agent) () () ()
3c (center agent of three-agent star) x () ()
3p (periphery agent of three-agent star) x x ()
For each of these cases, it can be proven by evaluating the payos with
and without the link that no link is created: in case (), a pair agent would
get payo

 i
μ
1
2
+
1
4
+
1
8
¶
+ (1 )
 s
μ
1
2
+
1
4
¶
 
 i + (1 )
 s
in case (), the pair agent would get payo

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 
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 s
in case (), the pair agent would get payo

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1
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in case (), a center agent would get payo

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in case (), the center agent would get payo

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and in case (), a periphery agent would get payo

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μ
1
4
+
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+
1
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+
1
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1
32
¶
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1
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+
1
4
¶
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¶
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
(=) For this part of the proof, we need some extra notation. The payo
function in (2.8) can be rewritten as
 () =
1
 ()
X
()
 () 
where  () is the total payo that j transmits to i via her direct link with
i. Formally,
 () = 



 i
()
+P
(0¯()\{})
P
(P0(): )
 i
0()·(())
2· 
	 
(	())
2


+(1 ) 

s
 ()

Assume that g is a pairwise stable structure. Let i be an agent in g and
   () be such that
	 () = min
()
 () 
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Suppose that there exists an agent    () for whom it holds that
 ()  	 () 
Deleting the link between i and k results in structure 0, where it holds that

¡
0
¢   ()  		   ¡0¢ 
since k, to whom j might be (in)directly linked, has one costly direct link
less, so more informational value might ow from 	 to  via  The payo
for i then becomes

¡
0
¢
=
1
 () 1
X
(0)

¡
0
¢

1
 ()
X
()
 () =  () 
which contradicts pairwise stability of g. It follows that
 () = 0 ()  		 	0   ()  (2.9)
Next, suppose that g contains a cycle, meaning that there exists a se-
quence of agents 1     for whom it holds that 	1	2 = 	2	3 =  =
	
1	
 = 	
	1 = 1. Let i be an agent in this cycle. Deleting the link with
one of ’s neighbors in the cycle, say k, results in 0, where it holds for the
other neighbor of i in the cycle, say m, that

¡
0
¢
  () 
since k, to whom m is (in)directly linked, has one costly direct link less, so
more informational value ows from  to  via  Moreover,

¡
0
¢   ()  		   ¡0¢ 
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The payo for i then becomes

¡
0
¢
=
1
 () 1
X
(0)

¡
0
¢

1
 () 1
X
(0)
 ()
=
1
 ()
X
()
 () =  () 
where the second equality follows from equation (2.9). This implies that g
is not pairwise stable, leading to a contradiction. We have therefore shown
that g does not contain any cycle.
Suppose that  consists of components that are not stars. Since we have
already shown that  contains no cycles, by denition all components of 
are trees. In a tree the number of links is one less than the number of agents.
Moreover, in a tree there is a unique path between any two agents. A tree
that is not a star contains an agent, say i, with a neighbor  that only has
 as a neighbor, and, moreover,  is directly linked to an agent 	 who has
another neighbor dierent from  According to equation (2.9) it holds that
() = ()
Since  has only one neighbor,  it follows that
() = 

i + (1 )
 s
We now evaluate () and show it is smaller than () Think of ¯()
as a tree with  as top agent. For players  0  ¯()  6= 0 player 0
is a subordinate of  denoted 0  ¯() if  is on the unique path from
 to 0 Player 0 is a direct subordinate of  denoted 0  () if 0 is a
subordinate of  and there is a link between  and 0 We write
() = 
i
() + (1 ) s()
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where
 s() =

 s
()
 

s
2
 (2.10)
and
 i() =

 i
()
+
X
	¯()

 i
	()(())
2
Q
	0 	(	0())
2

where 	 is the unique path between 	 and 
Consider   ¯() We dene the informational payo that  receives
from its subordinates by
 i	() =
1
	()
X
	0(	)
 i		0()
where  i		0() is dened analogously to 
i
()We obtain a recursive relation
by observing that
 i		0() =

 i +  i	0()
	0()

We show by induction that
 i	()  
 i(	() 1) (2.11)
from which it follows that
 i		0() 

 i + 
 i(	0() 1)
	0()
= 
 i
and, consequently,
 i()  
 i (2.12)
Let  0 be the set of agents without subordinates. For   1 let  
be the set of agents with all subordinates in  0
 · · · 
 1 Let 0 be the
smallest integer for which 	   0  First consider an agent  in  0 the set
of agents without subordinates. Then  i	() = 0 = 

i(	() 1) so (2.11)
is satised.
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Suppose that (2.11) holds for agents in     0 Consider an agent
   +1
 i	() =
1
	()
X
	0(	)
 i		0()
 1
	()
X
	0(	)
μ

 i + 
 i(	0() 1)
	0()
¶
=
	() 1
	()

 i  1
2

 i(	() 1)
so (2.11) holds for all   ¯()
Combining (2.10) and (2.12) implies ()  () a contradiction to
equation (2.9), so  consists of star components only.
Lemma 14 implies that these stars have at most three agents. “Stars”
of a single agent cannot be part of g, for it is always strictly benecial for
this single agent to create a link to the center agent of another star, whereas
this center agent is indierent or improves if she is isolated too.
Table 2.1 pictures all structures thus proven to be pairwise stable in
the case with both social and informational value from communication for
  6.
Comparing these results to the purely social value case, clearly a smaller
range of very fragmented structures turns out to be pairwise stable in the
mixed case where transferable informational value also plays a role. Speci-
cally, even with  slightly above zero, regular structures are never pairwise
stable and also the example structures in Figures 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 are not
stable anymore. This may seem counter-intuitive, since apparently transfe-
rability of informational value causes structures to become more fragmented
and therefore less able to transfer information.
The intuition behind this nding is that the link specicity property of
communication is now strong enough to prevent individuals from maintai-
ning many links, because it is strengthened by the transferability of value.
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 = 3
 = 4
 = 5
 = 6
Table 2.1: Pairwise Stable Structures With Informational Value
For example, in a wheel structure of three agents, an agent cannot improve
(or decrease) her social payo by deleting one of her links, but she can
improve her informational payo:

 i
2
+

 i
4

2
 i
4
+
2
 i
16

The co-author model of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) also contained a
type of link specicity, but since it was not combined with value transfe-
rability, the resulting stable structures were not as fragmented. Similarly,
the connections model of Jackson and Wolinsky contained value transfe-
rability, but since it was not combined with link specicity, the resulting
structures are not fragmented at all.
Likewise, most studies reveal less fragmented stable structures, e.g. Goyal
& Vega-Redondo (2004) nd large star structures in their setting of struc-
tural holes. Therefore, our model can explain real-life phenomena like
the evolvement of threads in online communities into strong reciprocal ties
(Fisher et al. 2006).
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2.4 Welfare
In this section, the structural results from the previous sections are assessed
by their impact on welfare. The welfare of a network structure is dened as
the sum of payos for all agents.6 The best and worst pairwise stable net-
work structures from a welfare point of view are characterized (Sections 2.4.1
and 2.4.2). It turns out that the purely social value situation performs badly
in the worst-case scenario, but that this usual tension between stability and
eciency (e.g., Jackson and Wolinsky 1996) is largely resolved in the mixed
situation with both social and informational value. We also identify die-
rences in welfare due to variations in social versus informational orientation
in the network (Section 2.4.3).
Denition 16 (welfare) The welfare provided by structure g is given by
! () =
X

 () 
Denition 17 (eciency) The structure g is more ecient than the struc-
ture 0 if it holds that
! ()  !
¡
0
¢

2.4.1 Best Pairwise Stable Structures
The next proposition describes the most ecient pairwise stable structures.
Proposition 18 If  is even, the most ecient pairwise stable structures
consist of pairs only. If  is odd, the most ecient pairwise stable structures
consist of one three-agent star and furthermore only pairs.
6Alternatively, it may be interesting from a managerial point of view, to study the
structural eects on the actual product-, service-, or rm-related information exchanged,
thus disregarding the value derived from the social aspects of communication. However,
this does not cause results to dier considerably.
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Proof. In the case with only social value ( = 0)
() =

 s
()
X
()
1
()

the highest possible payo for player  is obtained if () = 1 for all 	 
() If  belongs to a pair, then this condition holds, so a player in a pair
obtains the highest payo possible. The highest payo possible is therefore
equal to 
 s If a structure consists of only pairs, then all players get the
highest payo possible, and as a consequence, also the welfare provided by
the structure is maximized.
If  is odd, then the structure cannot consist of pairs only. There should
be at least one player, say  with at least two neighbors. Since pairwise sta-
ble structures are equal neighbor degree structures, all neighbors of neigh-
bors of  have the same degree as  and therefore ’s neighbors have a payo
equal to 
 s divided by () The sum of the payos of all players is there-
fore maximized if there is only one player with more than one neighbor, and
this player should have two neighbors. The structure therefore consists of
one three-agent star and furthermore only pairs.
In the case with both social and informational value (0    1) Propo-
sition 15 implies that all pairwise stable structures consist of disjoint star
components of two or three agents. The payo for an agent in a pair is

 i + (1 )
 s
whereas the average payo for an agent in a three-agent star is only
5
6

 i +
2
3
(1 )
 s
Welfare of the structure is maximized by having only pairs if  is even, and
one three-agent star and furthermore only pairs if  is odd.
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It is not hard to show that in the social value case, the structures identi-
ed in Proposition 18 are moreover the most ecient ones among all struc-
tures, pairwise stable or not. This conclusion does not dier when informa-
tional value is included in the analysis. Agents that are part of a pair obtain
the highest payo possible, 
 i + (1 )
 s so structures with many pairs
achieve a high degree of eciency.
The most ecient pairwise stable structures coincide in the purely so-
cial value case and the case with both social and informational value. The
worst-case scenarios, i.e. the least ecient pairwise stable structures, are
considerably dierent between these cases, as is shown in the next subsec-
tion.
2.4.2 Worst Pairwise Stable Structures
In the social value situation, many pairwise stable structures exist that are
not ecient. The worst-case scenario is described in the following proposi-
tion.
Proposition 19 In the social value case, the complete structure provides
the lowest welfare of all pairwise stable structures.
Proof. Since
() =

 s
()
X
()
1
()

and since every player has at least one link in a pairwise stable structure,
the lowest payo possible for player  is obtained if all players 	  ()
have maximal degree () =   1 It follows that the complete structure
has the lowest welfare of all pairwise stable structures.
The worst-case scenarios for the situation with both social and informa-
tional value are described in the following proposition.
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Proposition 20 In the case with both social and informational value,
(a) if   {3 6 9   }, a structure consisting of only three-agent stars
provides the lowest welfare of all pairwise stable structures,
(b) if   {4 7 10   }, a structure consisting of two pairs and further-
more only three-agent stars provides the lowest welfare of all pairwise stable
structures,7
(c) if   {5 8 11   }, a structure consisting of one pair and further-
more only three-agent stars provides the lowest welfare of all pairwise stable
structures.
Proof. Proposition 15 implies that all pairwise stable structures consist of
disjoint star components of two or three agents. The payo for an agent in
a pair is

 i + (1 )
 s
whereas the average payo for an agent in a three-agent star is only
5
6

 i +
2
3
(1 )
 s
which implies (a), (b), and (c).
Note that the worst-case scenarios in the situation with both social and
informational value are not as bad as the worst-case scenario in the social
value case. For any value of  
 i and 
 s the least ecient pairwise
stable structure achieves an eciency of at least 23 times the most ecient
structure. In the social value case, for any value of 
 s this ratio can be
as bad as 11  which tends to zero as  grows large. Therefore, the usual
tension between stability and eciency (e.g., Jackson and Wolinsky 1996)
can largely be resolved by introducing value transferability into a setting
with link specicity.
7For  = 4 this implies a structure consisting of two pairs only.
40 2. The Strategic Aspect: A Game-Theoretical Model
2.4.3 Informational versus Social Orientation
Apparently, there are welfare dierences attached to structural dierences
in an OCCN and structural dierences arise by its informational versus
social orientation (). A managerial implication is that the welfare level
provided by an OCCN can be inuenced depending on how strongly  can
be inuenced. In order to aect , communication network managers could
think of modifying moderator tasks, entry policy, rules of conduct, and
reward systems, hereby emphasizing social versus informational value. The
question whether more emphasis on social aspects rather than informational
aspects is required in maximizing welfare, depends on the ratio between 
 s
and 
 i We denote this ratio by ":

 s = "
 i
For  = 10 and three values for " the impact of  on welfare is illustrated in
Figure 2.4, where the top line each time indicates the welfare for the most
ecient pairwise stable structures and the bottom line for the least ecient
ones. More generally, we can prove the following two propositions.
Proposition 21 The worst-case scenario for social value only ( = 0) pro-
vides lower welfare than a worst-case scenario where also a marginal amount
of transferable informational value is provided (  0).8
Proof. For  = 0 Proposition 19 shows that the complete structure is the
worst-case scenario, which provides a total payo of

 1

s
8Note that results for the informational case ( = 1) can be derived analogously.
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Figure 2.4: Impact of  on Welfare Illustrated for  = 10
For 0    1 Proposition 20 shows that the total payo in the worst-case
scenario is at least equal to

μ
5
6

 i +
2
3
(1 )
 s
¶
 2
3

 s if   0
It holds that

2
3

 s 

 1

s
since   3
Proposition 22 In the case with both social and informational value,
(a) the higher  the better the best-case as well as the worst-case scena-
rios if "  1, and
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(b) the lower  the better the best-case as well as the worst-case scenarios
if "  114 .
9
Proof. If  is even, Proposition 18 implies that a structure consisting of
only pairs is a best-case scenario, which provides a total payo of

 i ((1 ")+ ") 
which is increasing in  if "  1 and decreasing in  if "  114 . If  is odd,
Proposition 18 implies that a structure consisting of one three-agent star
and furthermore only pairs is a best-case scenario, which provides a total
payo of

 i
μμ
 1
2
 ( 1)"
¶
+ ( 1)"
¶

which, since   3 is increasing in  if "  1 and decreasing in  if "  114 .
If  = 3 6 9  Proposition 20 implies that a structure consisting of only
three-agent stars is a worst-case scenario, which provides a total payo of

 i
μμ
5
6
 2
3
"
¶
+
2
3
"
¶

which is increasing in  if "  1 and decreasing in  if "  114 . If  =
4 7 10 , Proposition 20 implies that a structure consisting of two pairs and
furthermore only three-agent stars is a worst-case scenario, which provides
a total payo of

 i
μμ
5
6
+
2
3

μ
2
3
+ 1
1
3
¶
"
¶
+
μ
2
3
+ 1
1
3
¶
"
¶

which, since   4 is increasing in  if "  1 and decreasing in  if "  114 .
The proof for  = 5 8 11    is similar.
9For 	 between 1 and 1 1
4
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2.5 Discussion
This chapter has shown that the structure of bilateral communication links
within OCCNs can be appropriately studied using a model based on the
game-theoretic literature of social and economic network formation. A com-
bination of important aspects common to OCCNs was incorporated that had
not been investigated until now: the negative externality of link specicity
and the positive externality of informational value transferability.
In the case of communication having social value only, illustrating the
separate impact of link specicity on structure, the set of pairwise stable
structures was characterized and shown to include a wide range of non-
standard architectures like highly connected and “small world” structures,
whereas previous models for social and economic network formation mostly
predicted simple architectures like stars and wheels.
In the case of communication from which both social and informational
value is derived, illustrating the joint impact of link specicity and value
transferability on structure, only structures that consist of disjoint star com-
ponents of two or three agents were shown to be pairwise stable. Herewith,
we predict much more fragmentation than usually in the literature about
social and economic network formation, where mostly only one of these two
features was included.
From a welfare point of view, a mix of social and informational focus
was shown to be better than a purely social focus. This illustrates that
the fragmentation eect arising from the combination of link specicity and
value transferability decreases the common tension between stability and
eciency. Furthermore, guidelines were provided for when it is better to
stimulate either the social or the informational orientation of an OCCN as a
managerial concern. For example, a Saab representative could stimulate the
informational focus of the Saab network by introducing a reward system that
allows users to grade the usefulness of fellow users’ posts, or the social focus
by appointing moderators who inspire the exchange of personal experiences.
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Further research could study the sets of pairwise stable and ecient
network structures with other functional forms to model the link specicity
property of communication. In this chapter it is modeled such that value
is divided proportionally by the number of links that agents face, whereas
other link specicity forms might be applicable to other communication
forms. For example, agents may have economies of scale in coping with
several links or value derived from dierent agents may be complementary,
which would diminish the fragmentation eect as caused by the current form
of link specicity.
The informational versus social orientation is of managerial concern here.
The model can be extended to allow for investigating the eectiveness of
other community design issues, like introducing an expert or a social ani-
mator in the OCCN, who possibly does not even act strategically in the
link formation game. An example would be Dr. Love in the community
studied by Holme et al. (2004). Therefore, future research could introduce
valuation heterogeneity in the sense that agents represent dierent values
for their fellow customers or have dierent opinions on the values of their
fellow customers (e.g., Galeotti et al. 2006).
Another extension of the current model could be to relax the assump-
tion that agents divide their available eort equally among all their relation-
ships, thus entering the subject of link quality and dropping the common
1-0 formulation of links. As suggested by Goyal (2005), a rst step into this
direction would be to introduce a distinction between strong links in which
both agents actively interact with each other, and weak links in which one
agent is active and the other is not, where the passive agent can only access
the direct value from her active partner.
Besides, a possible follow-up would be to empirically examine the ap-
plicability of the used payo function in diverse contexts. The model could
be tested experimentally, contributing to an emerging literature as surveyed
by Kosfeld (2004). Accordingly, we hope that our current work stimulates
future research in the appealing area of OCCNs and the role of balancing
social and informational value in these communication networks.
Chapter 3
The Strategic Aspect:
A Simulation Approach
We study the structure and eciency of bilateral communication links by
a game-theoretic model of network formation. This enhances the model as
introduced in Chapter 2 in several respects. First, link specicity - mea-
ning that the more direct links somebody has to maintain with others, the
less she is able to specify her attention per link within her time available,
so that the value of her links decreases - is no longer xed at a high level.
Second, valuation heterogeneity is introduced, implying that agents represent
dierent values for each other. We simulate pairwise stable networks for
dierent levels of link specicity, focus on informational versus social value
from communication, and valuation heterogeneity. It is illustrated that their
structure properties heavily depend on these parameter values, which results
in eciency and equity dierences among settings. Accordingly, we assess
the eectivity of several managerial tools for common communication net-
works.
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3.1 Introduction
With this dissertation we study the structure and eciency of bilateral com-
munication links by a game-theoretic model of network formation in which
individuals choose to create and maintain links if the participants in the link
benet from doing so, which results in a pairwise stable network structure
(Jackson and Wolinsky 1996). In order to enlarge the model’s scope of ap-
plication as introduced in Chapter 2 to a broader range of communication
settings as well as to increase the model’s managerial relevance, this chapter
performs simulation studies for the model enhanced with two suggestions
for further research (see Section 2.5).
First, an important property of communication is link specicity (e.g.,
Currarini 2007), meaning that having to maintain more direct links leads
to somebody’s being less able to specify her attention per link within her
time available, so that the value of her links decreases. In Chapter 2 this
was modeled such that value is divided proportionally by the number of
links that agents face, whereas other functional forms might be applicable
to other communication settings: e.g., agents may have economies of scale in
coping with several links or value derived from dierent agents may be com-
plementary. Therefore, in the current chapter the extent of link specicity
is varied and thus no longer xed at this high level.
Second, this chapter introduces valuation heterogeneity in the sense that
agents may represent dierent values for each other. Consequently, the com-
mon simplifying assumption of agent homogeneity is relaxed (e.g., Galeotti
et al. 2006). In particular, we explore four relevant patterns of valuation:
homogeneity and expertise heterogeneity, each with and without the pre-
sence of one especially highly valued expert.
We simulate pairwise stable networks for three levels of link specicity,
three levels of focus on informational versus social value from communi-
cation, and four patterns of valuation heterogeneity. Structure and payo
properties of these networks are described and used to assess the eectivity
of several managerial tools for common communication networks.
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The chapter is structured as follows. In Section 3.2 we outline the net-
work formation model including the more general payo function allowing
for variable link specicity and heterogeneity. Section 3.3 describes the
simulation procedure for this model, Section 3.4 gives corresponding de-
nitions, and Section 3.5 provides its results. The subsequent eectivity of
management tools as well as suggestions for further research are discussed
in Section 3.6.
3.2 Model
The communication network formation model as introduced in Chapter 2 is
extended by variable link specicity and heterogeneity as follows. Consider
a community of agents  = {1     }    3. A direct link  between
agents i and j in this community ( 	   ;  6= 	) can be interpreted as an
undirected virtual communication relationship between i and j : for any two
agents i and j,  =  and  = 0 The total payo for agent i in link
structure  is given by
 () =

	

P
¯()
P
P()
 i
()·

	 
(	())
2·()

+(1 )P()  s(()·())
if  ()  0
0 if  () = 0
(3.1)
where  is the proportion of communication through each link in the commu-
nity that concerns product-, service- or rm-related information and 1 
is the proportion of communication through each link in the community
that concerns social interaction;  () is the set of agents with whom i
has a direct link, where agent j is a neighbor of agent i if 	   (), and
 () = | ()| is the number of neighbors of agent i, which can also be
referred to as the degree of i, and ¯ () is the set of agents with whom i has
either a direct or an indirect link; P () is the set of paths between i and j,
where a path is dened as a sequence of consecutive edges without repeated
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nodes, and  is the set of agents on path p between i and j excluding i and
j themselves; 
 i  0 denotes the informational value that i would derive
from communication with j if neither i nor j were linked to any other agent
and interaction would only have informational value, and 
 s  0 denotes
the social value that i would derive from communication with j if neither i
nor j were linked to any other agent and interaction would only have social
value; and # indicates the level of link specicity.
Observe that the contributions of two agents in their bilateral process of
communication value creation are reected by a Cobb-Douglas production
function with both output elasticities equal to #, which was assumed to equal
1 in Chapter 2. Also, in that chapter it was assumed that 
 i = 

i and

 s = 

s for all  	   . For the more general model thus described, stable
network structures are again predicted to emerge by using the concept of
pairwise stability (Jackson and Wolinsky 1996).
3.3 Method
The model is simulated as follows. A simulation starts with a random net-
work in the sense that for every  	   ;  6= 	,  is randomly chosen to
equal 0 or 1. In every iteration the program randomly determines whether
there will be an attempt to delete or create a link.
If for an iteration this turns out to be delete, one agent is randomly
drawn from the community and subsequently another one. If there exists a
link between these two agents, the rst agent calculates the payo she will
earn when she deletes this link (equation 3.1). If this is strictly higher than
the payo she earns with the current network, the deletion is performed. If
no link exists between the two agents or the rst agent does not gain by its
deletion, the current network is maintained until the next iteration.
If the attempt of the iteration appears to be create, two agents are
randomly drawn from the community. If no link exists between these two
agents, they both calculate the payo they will earn when they create such
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a link. If this is weakly higher for both agents and strictly higher for at
least one of them, the creation is performed. If there already exists a link
between these two agents or one of them looses or none of them gains by its
creation, the current network is maintained.
In this way, 10,000 iterations are performed consecutively. Afterwards
in the same simulation another 1,000 iterations are executed for which the
networks are stored. If these 1,000 networks are the same, it is assumed
that the simulation converged to a pairwise stable network. The program
performs 100 of these simulations for each of 3
¡
# = 12 
3
4  1
¢
1 x 3
¡
 = 0 12  1
¢
x 4 (see Section 3.4) parameter value combinations.
Subsequently, to compare outcomes to a situation in which agents hold
social preferences, for each of these settings the procedure is repeated, as-
suming that agents - instead of their personal payo - hold welfare as their
objective function:
! () =
X
=1
 () 
Pairwise stability in such a simulation - again assumed if the last 1,000
iteration outcomes are the same network - can be used to create a meaningful
measure of local eciency.
Denition 23 The structure g is locally ecient if for all  	   with
 = 1 it holds that
! () ! ¡0¢ 
where 0 is such that 0 = 0 and 
0
	
 = 	
 for all { } 6= { 	}, and for
all  	   with  = 0 it holds that
! () ! ¡0¢ 
where 0 is such that 0 = 1 and 
0
	
 = 	
 for all { } 6= { 	}.
Community size  = 6 is chosen for all simulations, since it is large
1Notice that  = 1
2
coincides with constant returns to scale in the Cobb-Douglas
function reecting agents’ contributions in the bilateral production of communication.
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enough to illustrate interesting tendencies as well as small enough to generate
reasonable calculation times regarding the exponentially increasing number
of paths in the payo function (equation 3.1). The tendencies in the results
are robust for the odd number of agents  = 5
3.4 Denitions
We dene the four valuation patterns for which we run simulations and the
structure measures we use to compare their outcomes.
3.4.1 Valuation Patterns
The rst pattern of valuation to consider is homogeneity, which we dene
as follows:

 i = 

s
 = 6 	 	   :  6= 	 (3.2)
Next, we study a valuation pattern that is heterogeneous in the sense
that all agents are equally valued except for one, who is much higher valued,
both socially and informationally. This pattern is based on the management
tool of adding an expert to the community. The valuations in the case that
agent 1 is an expert are given by

 i1 = 

s
1 = 21 	   :  6= 1

 i = 

s
 = 3 	 	   :  6= 	 	 6= 1 (3.3)
These values are such that the sum of valuations over the community of
6 agents is equal between this case and the completely homogeneous case.
Therefore, in the dierent valuation patterns the complete network provides
the same welfare given # and  (e.g., 90.37 for # = 12   = 1). Of course, the
empty network provides the same welfare in all parameter conditions (i.e.,
0).
Then, a valuation pattern is studied in which all agents can be ranked
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according to a gradually decreasing value they represent for others, both
socially and informationally. Expertise heterogeneity is dened as

 i1 = 

s
1 = 11 	   :  6= 1

 i2 = 

s
2 = 9 	   :  6= 2

 i3 = 

s
3 = 7 	   :  6= 3

 i4 = 

s
4 = 5 	   :  6= 4

 i5 = 

s
5 = 3 	   :  6= 5

 i6 = 

s
6 = 1 	   :  6= 6 (3.4)
Again these values are such that the sum of valuations over the community
of 6 agents is equal among valuation patterns.
Finally, we investigate a valuation pattern in which the eects of equa-
tions 3.3 and 3.4 are combined: except for one, who is valued much higher,
all agents can be ranked according to a gradually decreasing value they re-
present for others, both socially and informationally. To equal the sum of
valuations over the community among valuation patterns, we dene exper-
tise heterogeneity with expert as

 i1 = 

s
1 = 21 	   :  6= 1

 i2 = 

s
2 = 5 	   :  6= 2

 i3 = 

s
3 = 4 	   :  6= 3

 i4 = 

s
4 = 3 	   :  6= 4

 i5 = 

s
5 = 2 	   :  6= 5

 i6 = 

s
6 = 1 	   :  6= 6 (3.5)
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3.4.2 Structure Measures
In order to compare simulation outcomes among levels of # and , we use
the density of a structure (Wasserman and Faust 1994, p. 164):
$ =
P
=1  ()
 ( 1) 
Our intuitive prediction is that in general, a higher level of link specicity
(#) makes communication more costly, and therefore the expected density
of a simulated network is lower. Furthermore, a higher level of focus on
informational value () provides more value spillovers from indirect links,
and thus the expected density of a pairwise stable network is higher.
For the valuation patterns (3.3), (3.4), and (3.5), we use an additional
structure variable to compare pairwise stable networks among levels of #
and  on an individual level: in how far an agent takes a central position
relative to the other agents. Relative centrality of agent  is dened as
	 =
³
	()
1




=1 ()
´
 1
( 2) 2 
This measure is adapted from standardized actor degree centrality (Wasser-
man and Faust 1994, p. 179) to express the centrality of an agent as relative
to the centrality of the other agents in the community, where it holds that
X
	=1
	 = 1
For example, in a complete or empty network all agents have a relative
centrality equal to 0 and the center agent of the star structure with ( 1)
periphery agents has a relative centrality equal to 1.
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3.5 Results
In this section we discuss the simulation outcomes for the parameter settings
as mentioned.
3.5.1 Convergence
It appears that all 100 simulations in every setting converge to pairwise sta-
ble networks as described above (page 49). Therefore, we deal with structure
and payo properties of these networks.
3.5.2 Homogeneity
For homogeneity as dened in (3.2), the following subsections discuss struc-
ture properties of the simulated pairwise stable and locally ecient networks
and then their payo properties.
Structure Properties
For # = 1, the simulation outcomes conrm the analytical results from
Chapter 2. For   0 the pairwise stable networks consist of disjoint star
components of two or three agents only whereas for  = 0 they for instance
also contain wheel components. The locally ecient networks for # = 1 con-
sist of disjoint star components of two or three agents for 0    1 so not
only of pairs like the most ecient pairwise stable networks from Chapter 2.
Thus, also with this local eciency measure the tendency between eciency
and stability for # = 1,  = 0 is validated.
For each combination of three levels of link specicity and three levels of
focus on informational versus social value from communication, the average
density and the standard deviation of the 100 simulated pairwise stable and
locally ecient networks are given in Table 3.1. Results for local eciency
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are indicated in Italics in separate columns in all following tables. Further-
more, in all structure tables one, two, or three stars mark a dierence of
pairwise stability with respect to local eciency of at least 0.1, 0.2, or 0.3
respectively.
\ 0 1
2
1
1
2
1.00*** 0.556 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
(0.000) (0.136) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
3
4
0.887*** 0.231 0.916*** 0.222 0.839*** 0.394
(0.208) (0.033) (0.194) (0.031) (0.207) (0.019)
1 0.280 0.233 0.231 0.239 0.234 0.236
(0.106) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.035)
Table 3.1: Densities for Homogeneity
The basic intuition about the eect of # on density is thus conrmed by
the simulation outcomes, for the well-known fragmentation for # = 1 (e.g.,
for  = 12 : $ = 0231) reverses to complete networks when # decreases to
1
2 ($ = 100). However, the intuition about the eect of  on density is
contradicted by the simulation outcomes as it was by the analytical results
of Chapter 2 for # = 1, since for # = 34 we nd a higher density for  =
1
2
(0916) than for  = 1 (0839) This can again be ascribed to the interaction
eect of value transferability and link specicity.
We see that whereas for # = 1, fragmentation eliminates dierences
between locally ecient and pairwise stable networks (even for  = 0, the
simulation process appears to select the less dense pairwise stable networks
and for example no complete structures), for # = 12 the opposite eect
performs the same job: except for the locally ecient networks for  = 0,
all locally ecient as well as pairwise stable networks are full structures.
For the intermediate level of specicity (# = 34), we nd large dierences
in density between the locally ecient and pairwise stable networks in the
sense that the pairwise stable networks are more connected. The following
example elaborates one of these cases.
Example 24 Let # = 34 ,  =
1
2 , then Table 3.2 provides an overview of the
types and numbers of pairwise stable networks resulting from 100 simulations
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pairwise stable networks
84 6
8 2
locally ecient networks
67 9
24
Table 3.2: Example of Structures for Homogeneity
and the types and numbers of locally ecient networks resulting from another
100 simulations.
Thus, for this intermediate level of #, the pairwise stable networks are
highly connected as with lower levels of link specicity, whereas the locally
ecient networks are very fragmented as with higher levels of link specicity.
Payo Properties
As a means to investigate in how far the structure dierences between the
locally ecient and pairwise stable networks actually lead to welfare dif-
ferences, for each parameter setting, the average welfare and the standard
deviation of the simulated pairwise stable and locally ecient networks are
given in Table 3.3. Furthermore, in all payo tables one, two, or three stars
mark a dierence of pairwise stability with respect to local eciency of at
least 10, 20, or 30% respectively. For comparison, the expected welfare from
a random network (based on 1000 random networks generated like in the
simulations) and the maximal welfare have been calculated for each setting
and are indicated in the table with r and m respectively.
\ 0 1
2
1
1
2
36.00 35.94 r 33.3 63.19 63.19 r 50.2 90.37 90.37 r 67.0
(0.000) (0.087) m 36.0 (0.000) (0.000) m 63.2 (0.000) (0.000) m 90.4
3
4
17.81*** 32.46 r 20.1 21.38*** 34.77 r 26.0 27.17*** 38.97 r 31.1
(3.26) (3.84) m 36.0 (3.43) (1.80) m 36.0 (4.44) (0.592) m 39.2
1 29.16 30.00 r 13.5 31.86 30.36 r 15.1 32.88 32.21 r 17.1
(8.15) (6.00) m 36.0 (4.49) (4.72) m 36.0 (3.08) (3.84) m 36.0
Table 3.3: Welfare for Homogeneity
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Although we have seen that a higher  and thus more value transferabi-
lity does not always lead to more dense networks, it apparently does always
lead to higher welfare. Therefore, in a homogeneous setting, stimulating the
focus on informational value in the community is a generally eective tool
for boosting welfare. This eectivity is larger the smaller # Furthermore,
though a lower # has been shown to lead to higher density, it only leads to
subsequent higher welfare when the link specicity is low enough, since for
intermediate values of #, welfare is much lower. This implies that enhan-
cing communication in the community by decreasing link specicity from a
high to an intermediate level counterintuitively results in lower welfare from
communication.
We nd that the structure dierence found for  = 0 # = 12 does not
lead to a subsequent welfare dierence, but for the intermediate level of
specicity (# = 34), the tension between local eciency and pairwise stability
is considerable (even larger than 30%).
3.5.3 Homogeneity with Expert
For homogeneity with expert as dened in (3.3), structure and payo prop-
erties of the simulated pairwise stable and locally ecient networks are dis-
cussed. Before that, more general analytical results are provided for # = 1
in line with Chapter 2.
Analytical Results
For # = 1 and 0    1 if we assume a valuation pattern deviating from full
homogeneity in the sense that there is one agent 	 who is valued dierently
than all other agents, it can be proven that all pairwise stable structures
consist of small star components and one possibly larger component without
cycles containing the diering agent 	 but not at the periphery. In particular,
this component may be a star component with agent 	 at the center.
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Proposition 25 Let 	   , where 
 i = 
 i  
 s = 
 s 	 6= 	, 
 i	 =

 i  
 s	 = 
 s 	 6= 	 	 6= , and 
 i + (1 )
 s 6= 
 i + (1 )
 s
A structure is pairwise stable if it consists of disjoint star components of
two or three agents and a special star component with 	 as the center agent,
where the number of periphery agents "  {1 2   1} satises
" = 1  
 i 3 + (1 )
 s 4  
 i (2" 3) + (1 )
 s2" (3.6)
and if there is a three-agent star besides the special component also

 i + (1 )
 s  
 i
11"2  16"+ 16
16"
+ (1 )
 s 1
2
" (3.7)
 
 i  
 i
"2  "+ 1
"
(3.8)
 
 i 5
16
" = (1 )


 s
1
2
" 
 s
¸
 (3.9)
Proof. It is not benecial for any of the periphery agents in a star compo-
nent to delete her single link as then her payo will be zero. Equivalently,
for the center agent in a star component of at least three agents, deleting a
link with any of the periphery agents is not benecial as it will provide her
with the same payo.
With respect to link creating possibilities, we have to examine the fol-
lowing cases () ():
2 3c 3p sc sp
2 (pair agent) () () () () ()
3c (center agent of 3-agent star) x () () () ()
3p (periphery agent of 3-agent star) x x (	) ()2 () ()
sc (center agent of special star (j )) x x x x x
sp (periphery agent of special star) x x x x ()
2 () is the case with two agents from dierent stars and () is the case with two agents
from the same star.
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For each of these cases, it can be proven by evaluating the payos with
and without the link that no link is created. Cases (), (), (), (), (),
(	), and () have been proven at Proposition 15 in Chapter 2.
In case (), the center agent of the special component would get payo

 i
μ
1
2 ("+ 1)
+
"
"+ 1
+
1
4 ("+ 1)
¶
+(1 )
 s
μ
1
2 ("+ 1)
+
"
"+ 1
¶
 
 i
³"
"
´
+ (1 )
 s
³"
"
´

In case (), if the periphery agent of the special component would be
willing to create the link, it should hold that



 i
μ
1
4
+
1
8
+
" 1
2"2
¶
+ 
 i
1
2"
¸
+ (1 )


 s
1
4
+ 
 s
1
2"
¸
 


 i
" 1
"2
+ 
 i
1
"
¸
+ (1 )
 s
1
"

but then it follows that the payo of the pair agent



 i
μ
1
2
+
1
4
+
" 1
8"2
¶
+ 
 i
1
8"
¸
+(1 )
 s
μ
1
2
+
1
4
¶
would be smaller than 
 i + (1 )
 s.
In case (), the center agent of the special component would get payo

 i
μ
1
3 ("+ 1)
+
"
"+ 1
+
2
9 ("+ 1)
¶
+(1 )
 s
μ
1
3 ("+ 1)
+
"
"+ 1
¶
 
 i
³"
"
´
+ (1 )
 s
³"
"
´

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In case (), if the periphery agent of the special component would be
willing to create the link, it should hold that



 i
μ
1
6
+
2
18
+
" 1
2"2
¶
+ 
 i
1
2"
¸
+ (1 )


 s
1
6
+ 
 s
1
2"
¸
 


 i
" 1
"2
+ 
 i
1
"
¸
+ (1 )
 s
1
"

but then it follows that the payo of the center agent of the three-agent star



 i
μ
2
3
+
1
6
+
" 1
12"2
¶
+ 
 i
1
12"
¸
+(1 )
 s
μ
2
3
+
1
6
¶
would be smaller than 
 i + (1 )
 s.
In case (), the center agent of the special component would get payo

 i
μ
1
2 ("+ 1)
+
"
"+ 1
+
1
8 ("+ 1)
+
1
16 ("+ 1)
¶
+(1 )
 s
μ
1
2 ("+ 1)
+
"
"+ 1
¶
 
 i
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"
´
+ (1 )
 s
³"
"
´
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In case (), either the periphery agent of the special component would
get payo



 i
μ
1
4
+
1
16
+
1
32
+
" 1
2"2
¶
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 i
1
2"
¸
+ (1 )


 s
1
4
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 s
1
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¸
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which is smaller than



 i
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"
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because of condition (3.7), or the periphery agent of the three-agent star
would get payo



 i
μ
2
4
+
1
8
+
" 1
8"2
¶
+ 
 i
1
8"
¸
+ (1 )
 s 2
4

which is smaller than

 i
μ
1
2
+
1
4
¶
+ (1 )
 s 1
2
because of condition (3.8), or both agents would be equally o because of
condition (3.9).
In case (), where "  2, each agent would get payo



 i
μ
1
4
+
1
4"2
+
" 2
2"2
+
" 2
8"2
¶
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 i
μ
1
2"
+
1
8"
¶¸
+(1 )


 s
1
4
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 s
1
2"
¸
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which is not larger than



 i
" 1
"2
+ 
 i
1
"
¸
+ (1 )
 s
1
"
because of condition (3.6).
Proposition 26 Let 	   , where 
 i = 
 i  
 s = 
 s 	 6= 	, 
 i	 =

 i  
 s	 = 
 s 	 6= 	 	 6= , and 
 i + (1 )
 s 6= 
 i + (1 )
 s A
structure is only pairwise stable if it consists of disjoint star components of
two or three agents and a special component without cycles containing agent
	, who is not located at the periphery if there is at least one non-periphery
agent.
Proof. The proof that the pairwise stable structure g does not contain
cycles is the same as with Proposition 15 in Chapter 2. Also it follows
that when a component of  does not contain agent 	 and therefore only
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consists of homogenous agents, it must be a star of two or three agents.
A tree component with 	 in the periphery cannot be part of , since it is
always strictly benecial for some non-periphery agent of such a component
to delete the link with her neighbor either at the side of 	 or at the other
side, for 
 i + (1 )
 s 6= 
 i + (1 )
 s 
The following example illustrates that the conditions given in Proposition
25 are not necessary for pairwise stability.
Example 27 Assume 
 i = 

s
 =
29
16  

i = 
 s = 1  = 12  It is easy to
see that for these particular valuations, the following structure is pairwise
stable.
Figure 3.1: A Non-Star Pairwise Stable Structure in the Expert Case
Structure Properties
With the specic expert valuation pattern dened for our simulations in
(3.3), condition (3.6) reduces to
" = 1  "  14 2
which holds for any possible " given  = 6. Also, condition (3.7) reduces to
(3+ 8)"2  (16+ 112)"+ 16  0
and thus there is no further restriction on x for the case that there is a
three-agent star besides the special component. This result is conrmed by
the simulation outcomes: for # = 1 and  = 12 , each pairwise stable network
consists of two- and three-agent stars and in 36 cases a star component with
agent 1 in the centre and three or ve periphery agents.
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For each parameter setting, the average density and the standard devia-
tion of the simulated pairwise stable and locally ecient networks are given
in Table 3.4.
\ 0 1
2
1
1
2
0.333 0.333 0.976** 0.721 1.00 1.00
(0.000) (0.000) (0.076) (0.026) (0.000) (0.000)
3
4
0.319 0.246 0.333* 0.229 0.333 0.333
(0.061) (0.031) (0.000) (0.033) (0.000) (0.000)
1 0.263 0.219 0.245 0.234 0.253 0.233
(0.047) (0.030) (0.038) (0.033) (0.044) (0.033)
Table 3.4: Densities for Homogeneity with Expert
Although some density values thus are lower than in the completely
homogeneous case (Table 3.1), the basic intuition that increasing # implies
decreasing density is again conrmed by the simulation outcomes. Also,
the intuition about the positive eect of  on density is realized by the
simulation outcomes more than with complete homogeneity.
Since the densities of the locally ecient and pairwise stable structures
do not dier that much, we also look at the relative centralities. For each
parameter setting, the average relative centrality and the standard deviation
of all agents in the simulated pairwise stable and locally ecient networks
are given in Table 3.5.
Apparently, decreasing # leads to more centrality for the expert rst,
after which the density increases further such that the centrality of the
expert decreases again. Also  does not have a consistent eect on expert
centrality.
For this valuation pattern we do nd considerable dierences between
pairwise stable and locally ecient structures: except for # = 12  the relative
centrality of the expert is higher in the pairwise stable networks than in the
locally ecient ones. In the following example we illustrate the case with
the largest centrality dierence.
Example 28 For # = 34 and  =
1
2 , Table 3.6 provides an overview of the
types and numbers of pairwise stable networks resulting from 100 simulations
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\ 0 1
2
1
1
2
1:
1.00
(0.000)
2:
-0.200
(0.000)
3:
-0.200
(0.000)
4:
-0.200
(0.000)
5:
-0.200
(0.000)
6:
-0.200
(0.000)
1:
1.00
(0.000)
2:
-0.200
(0.000)
3:
-0.200
(0.000)
4:
-0.200
(0.000)
5:
-0.200
(0.000)
6:
-0.200
(0.000)
1:
0.016*
(0.052)
2:
0.004
(0.013)
3:
0.000
(0.039)
4:
-0.008
(0.063)
5:
0.000
(0.039)
6:
-0.012
(0.072)
1:
0.194
(0.026)
2:
-0.036
(0.061)
3:
-0.037
(0.061)
4:
-0.037
(0.061)
5:
-0.037
(0.061)
6:
-0.047
(0.058)
1:
0.000
(0.000)
2:
0.000
(0.000)
3:
0.000
(0.000)
4:
0.000
(0.000)
5:
0.000
(0.000)
6:
0.000
(0.000)
1:
0.000
(0.000)
2:
0.000
(0.000)
3:
0.000
(0.000)
4:
0.000
(0.000)
5:
0.000
(0.000)
6:
0.000
(0.000)
3
4
1:
0.497**
(0.418)
2:
-0.109
(0.118)
3:
-0.098
(0.122)
4:
-0.111
(0.119)
5:
-0.093
(0.125)
6:
-0.086
(0.126)
1:
0.259
(0.239)
2:
-0.056
(0.107)
3:
-0.049
(0.126)
4:
-0.041
(0.132)
5:
-0.056
(0.107)
6:
-0.056
(0.107)
1:
0.925***
(0.276)
2:
-0.185*
(0.065)
3:
-0.185*
(0.065)
4:
-0.185*
(0.065)
5:
-0.191*
(0.051)
6:
-0.179*
(0.077)
1:
0.189
(0.247)
2:
-0.040
(0.085)
3:
-0.025
(0.100)
4:
-0.040
(0.085)
5:
-0.044
(0.080)
6:
-0.040
(0.085)
1:
1.00***
(0.000)
2:
-0.200*
(0.000)
3:
-0.200*
(0.000)
4:
-0.200*
(0.000)
5:
-0.200*
(0.000)
6:
-0.200*
(0.000)
1:
0.418
(0.083)
2:
-0.059
(0.150)
3:
-0.095
(0.143)
4:
-0.080
(0.147)
5:
-0.098
(0.142)
6:
-0.086
(0.146)
1
1:
0.366**
(0.369)
2:
-0.072
(0.107)
3:
-0.085
(0.095)
4:
-0.079
(0.101)
5:
-0.069
(0.107)
6:
-0.061
(0.115)
1:
0.111
(0.223)
2:
-0.016
(0.156)
3:
-0.006
(0.140)
4:
-0.014
(0.125)
5:
-0.034
(0.112)
6:
-0.041
(0.090)
1:
0.311*
(0.302)
2:
-0.053
(0.110)
3:
-0.071
(0.086)
4:
-0.064
(0.097)
5:
-0.071
(0.086)
6:
-0.053
(0.110)
1:
0.113
(0.232)
2:
-0.030
(0.130)
3:
-0.011
(0.160)
4:
-0.019
(0.165)
5:
-0.030
(0.130)
6:
-0.023
(0.154)
1:
0.308*
(0.361)
2:
-0.071
(0.108)
3:
-0.067
(0.124)
4:
-0.048
(0.151)
5:
-0.052
(0.157)
6:
-0.071
(0.120)
1:
0.129
(0.227)
2:
-0.033
(0.127)
3:
-0.014
(0.139)
4:
-0.018
(0.147)
5:
-0.036
(0.124)
6:
-0.029
(0.140)
Table 3.5: Centralities for Homogeneity with Expert
and the types and numbers of locally ecient networks resulting from another
100 simulations.
Thus, in the pairwise stable networks the expert takes a central position
as with lower levels of link specicity and value transferability, whereas in
the locally ecient networks the expert is only slightly more central than the
other community members as with higher levels of link specicity and value
transferability.
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pairwise stable networks
93 3
4
locally ecient networks
56 21
23
Table 3.6: Example of Structures for Homogeneity with Expert
Payo Properties
As a means to investigate in how far the structure dierences between the
locally ecient and pairwise stable networks actually lead to welfare dif-
ferences, for each parameter setting, the average welfare and the standard
deviation of the simulated pairwise stable and locally ecient networks are
given in Table 3.7.
\ 0 1
2
1
1
2
53.67 53.67 r 33.2 63.07 64.04 r 50.3 90.37 90.37 r 67.5
(0.000) (0.000) m 53.7 (0.370) (0.110) m 64.1 (0.000) (0.000) m 90.4
3
4
35.82 36.18 r 21.0 38.36 37.11 r 26.2 41.25 41.02 r 31.1
(2.02) (0.989) m 37.6 (0.825) (1.35) m 39.3 (0.000) (0.149) m 41.5
1 30.81 33.78 r 13.6 32.70 33.56 r 15.4 32.86 34.25 r 16.8
(3.71) (2.90) m 36.0 (2.85) (2.40) m 36.0 (3.06) (1.79) m 36.0
Table 3.7: Welfare for Homogeneity with Expert
Again we nd that a higher  and thus more value transferability always
leads to higher welfare. Therefore, also in a homogeneous setting with one
expert, stimulating the focus on informational value in the community is a
generally eective tool for boosting welfare. Moreover, in this setting a lower
# also consistently leads to subsequent higher welfare. This implies that
enhancing communication in the community by decreasing link specicity
becomes a complementary tool to increase welfare from communication.
Apparently, the dierence in centralization does not lead to any serious
( 10%) tension between overall local eciency and pairwise stability. Also
on the individual payo level there are no large payo dierences between
pairwise stable and locally ecient networks, nor for the expert nor for the
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other community members. Comparing Tables 3.3 and 3.7, adding an expert
to a homogeneous community appears to be an eective welfare-increasing
tool for intermediate link specicity.
3.5.4 Expertise Heterogeneity
For expertise heterogeneity as dened in (3.4), structure and payo proper-
ties of the simulated pairwise stable and locally ecient networks are dis-
cussed. Before that, a general analytical result is provided for # = 1 in line
with Chapter 2.
Analytical Result
For # = 1 and 0    1 if we assume any heterogeneous valuation pattern,
the fragmented pairwise stable structure of the more homogeneous cases
persists, where highly valued agents tend to link to each other. It can be
proven that there always exists a pair structure that is pairwise stable, which
can be found by ranking agents with respect to their valuation.
Proposition 29 If n is even and if the agents are ranked such that it holds
for agent (%) with rank % = 1 2   that

 i() + (1 )
 s()  
 i(+1) + (1 )
 s(+1) (3.10)
the pairwise structure in which  (%) is linked with  (% + 1), where % =
1 3 5   1, is pairwise stable.
Proof. It is never benecial for any of the agents to delete her link, as then
her payo will be zero. Moreover, no link is created if any agent strictly
looses by linking to a lower-ranked agent - i.e., an agent with higher % - from
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another pair, so if 	%  {1 3 5   1}  	"  {2 4 6   %  1} :
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We show (3.11), whereas (3.12), (3.13), and (3.14) are similar. It follows
from (3.10) that
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³
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´
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Therefore, it holds that
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
from which (3.11) follows.
This type of ranking by agents is even more thinkable since rankings by
fellow consumers are publicly recorded in many OCCNs, see for example on
forums.itrc.hp.com/cm/.
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Note that the network structures that only consists of pairs, which are
formed according to the ranking system, need not be the only pairwise stable
structures. In particular, like in the more homogeneous cases, all kinds
of structures consisting of small, disjoint star components, can be pairwise
stable. As suggested by Section 3.5.3, the smallness of these star components
can be partly eliminated by the presence of an expert in the eld, but is
stimulated again by heterogeneity among consumers, which causes experts
to form small components with each other.
Structure Properties
With the specic heterogeneous valuation pattern dened for our simulations
in (3.4), # = 1 and  = 12 , inequality (3.10) is fullled when % =  	%. This
result is conrmed by the simulation outcomes: 42 of the 100 simulated
pairwise stable networks consist of the disjoint pair components 1-2, 3-4,
and 5-6. Moreover, all other pairwise stable networks also only consist of
pairs that do not link the extremely valuated agents to each other: 1-3, 2-4,
5-6 (22); 1-4, 2-3, 5-6 (21); 1-2, 3-5, 4-6 (12); and 1-3, 2-5, 4-6 (3).
For each parameter setting, the average density and the standard devia-
tion of the simulated pairwise stable and locally ecient networks are given
in Table 3.8.
\ 0 1
2
1
1
2
0.533 0.461 0.789* 0.927 0.977 1.00
(0.000) (0.107) (0.133) (0.019) (0.101) (0.000)
3
4
0.301 0.215 0.265 0.231 0.236* 0.343
(0.082) (0.028) (0.067) (0.033) (0.059) (0.023)
1 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.203 0.200 0.212
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.013) (0.000) (0.026)
Table 3.8: Densities for Expertise Heterogeneity
The density values thus are more similar to the expert case (Table 3.4)
than to the completely homogeneous case (Table 3.1); the basic intuition
that increasing # implies decreasing density is again conrmed by the si-
mulation outcomes and once more the intuition about the positive eect of
 on density is not always realized by the simulation outcomes.
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Since again the densities of the locally ecient and pairwise stable struc-
tures do not dier that much, for each parameter setting, the average relative
centrality and the standard deviation of all agents in the simulated pairwise
stable and locally ecient networks are given in Table 3.9.
\ 0 1
2
1
1
2
1:
0.250
(0.000)
2:
0.179
(0.091)
3:
0.134*
(0.091)
4:
0.063
(0.000)
5:
-0.125
(0.000)
6:
-0.500**
(0.000)
1:
0.340
(0.092)
2:
0.152
(0.084)
3:
0.018
(0.081)
4:
-0.070
(0.073)
5:
-0.172
(0.067)
6:
-0.269
(0.064)
1:
0.070
(0.032)
2:
0.070
(0.032)
3:
0.070
(0.032)
4:
0.070
(0.032)
5:
0.021
(0.085)
6:
-0.303**
(0.214)
1:
0.039
(0.012)
2:
0.039
(0.012)
3:
0.029
(0.021)
4:
0.029
(0.021)
5:
-0.068
(0.009)
6:
-0.068
(0.009)
1:
0.006
(0.028)
2:
0.006
(0.028)
3:
0.006
(0.028)
4:
0.006
(0.028)
5:
-0.007
(0.051)
6:
-0.019
(0.084)
1:
0.000
(0.000)
2:
0.000
(0.000)
3:
0.000
(0.000)
4:
0.000
(0.000)
5:
0.000
(0.000)
6:
0.000
(0.000)
3
4
1:
0.359**
(0.182)
2:
0.132*
(0.109)
3:
0.008
(0.066)
4:
-0.064
(0.087)
5:
-0.139*
(0.105)
6:
-0.294**
(0.200)
1:
0.069
(0.183)
2:
0.020
(0.122)
3:
-0.010
(0.076)
4:
-0.021
(0.064)
5:
-0.029
(0.053)
6:
-0.029
(0.053)
1:
0.336**
(0.188)
2:
0.049
(0.050)
3:
0.049
(0.050)
4:
-0.098
(0.100)
5:
-0.098
(0.100)
6:
-0.238*
(0.182)
1:
0.091
(0.153)
2:
0.031
(0.161)
3:
0.028
(0.152)
4:
-0.033
(0.098)
5:
-0.059
(0.062)
6:
-0.059
(0.062)
1:
0.313*
(0.218)
2:
0.027
(0.044)
3:
0.027
(0.044)
4:
-0.024
(0.085)
5:
-0.054
(0.089)
6:
-0.289*
(0.212)
1:
0.122
(0.108)
2:
0.086
(0.035)
3:
0.083
(0.062)
4:
-0.031
(0.139)
5:
-0.091
(0.134)
6:
-0.169
(0.074)
1
1:
0.000
(0.000)
2:
0.000
(0.000)
3:
0.000
(0.000)
4:
0.000
(0.000)
5:
0.000
(0.000)
6:
0.000
(0.000)
1:
0.000
(0.000)
2:
0.000
(0.000)
3:
0.000
(0.000)
4:
0.000
(0.000)
5:
0.000
(0.000)
6:
0.000
(0.000)
1:
0.000
(0.000)
2:
0.000
(0.000)
3:
0.000
(0.000)
4:
0.000
(0.000)
5:
0.000
(0.000)
6:
0.000
(0.000)
1:
0.029
(0.124)
2:
0.003
(0.039)
3:
-0.005
(0.024)
4:
-0.005
(0.024)
5:
-0.001
(0.033)
6:
-0.020
(0.131)
1:
0.000
(0.000)
2:
0.000
(0.000)
3:
0.000
(0.000)
4:
0.000
(0.000)
5:
0.000
(0.000)
6:
0.000
(0.000)
1:
0.021
(0.131)
2:
-0.006
(0.082)
3:
-0.015
(0.059)
4:
0.008
(0.010)
5:
-0.004
(0.089)
6:
-0.004
(0.155)
Table 3.9: Centralities for Expertise Heterogeneity
Similarly to the expert case, decreasing # leads to more centrality for the
highest valued agent and furthermore less centrality for the lowest valued
agent rst, after which the density increases further such that these centra-
lities become closer again. Also  does not always have a consistent eect
on relative centralities.
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pairwise stable networks
49 23
28
locally ecient networks
53 7
40
Table 3.10: Example of Structures for Expertise Heterogeneity
Now we do nd dierences between pairwise stable and locally ecient
structures: except for # = 1 with high fragmentation, the dierence between
the relative centralities of the most and least highly valued agents is higher
in the pairwise stable networks than in the locally ecient ones. In the
following example we illustrate one of these cases.
Example 30 Let # = 34 ,  =
1
2 , then Table 3.10 provides an overview of the
types and numbers of pairwise stable networks resulting from 100 simulations
and the types and numbers of locally ecient networks resulting from another
100 simulations.
Thus, in the pairwise stable networks agent 1 is relatively central and
agent 6 is relatively isolated, whereas in the locally ecient networks all
agents are more equally centralized.
Payo Properties
As a means to investigate in how far the structure dierences between the
locally ecient and stable networks actually lead to welfare dierences, for
each parameter setting, the average welfare and the standard deviation of
the simulated pairwise stable and locally ecient networks are given in Table
3.11.
Except for # = 1, we again nd that a higher  and thus more value
transferability leads to higher welfare. Therefore, also in a heterogeneous
setting, stimulating the focus on informational value in the community is an
eective tool for boosting welfare. However, in this setting a lower # does
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\ 0 1
2
1
1
2
36.46 39.83 r 33.5 59.72 63.63 r 50.4 89.34 90.37 r 67.4
(0.262) (0.350) m 40.3 (3.67) (0.182) m 63.7 (4.73) (0.000) m 90.4
3
4
28.22** 35.27 r 21.0 32.78 35.75 r 26.1 36.13 39.52 r 31.0
(4.52) (1.55) m 36.0 (2.06) (0.567) m 36.2 (0.576) (0.372) m 40.0
1 36.00 36.00 r 13.5 36.00 35.30 r 15.4 36.00 34.48 r 16.6
(0.000) (0.000) m 36.0 (0.000) (2.29) m 36.0 (0.000) (2.94) m 36.0
Table 3.11: Welfare for Expertise Heterogeneity
not consistently lead to subsequent higher welfare, since for intermediate link
specicity welfare is often lower, similarly to the completely homogeneous
case. This implies that counterintuitively, enhancing communication in the
community by decreasing link specicity is not always an eective tool to
increase welfare from communication.
The dierences in centralization apparently lead to some tension between
overall local eciency and pairwise stability (until 20% for # = 34 ,  = 0).
We also look at the individual payos in the dierent parameter settings
to study equity issues. For each parameter setting, the average individual
payo and the standard deviation of all agents in the simulated pairwise
stable and locally ecient networks are given in Table 3.12.
We thus nd that on the individual level there are considerable payo
dierences between pairwise stable and locally ecient networks: except
for # = 12 ,  = 1, the dierence between the payo of the most and least
highly valued agents is higher in the pairwise stable networks than in the
locally ecient ones. This even holds for # = 1, since as described above,
more similarly valuated agents tend to form disjoint pairs with each other in
the pairwise stable networks, whereas also other combinations are present
in the pair components of the locally ecient networks. Therefore, social
preferences would be more benecial to equity than to eciency.
3.5.5 Expertise Heterogeneity with Expert
For expertise heterogeneity as dened in (3.5), structure and payo proper-
ties of the simulated pairwise stable and locally ecient networks are dis-
cussed.
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\ 0 1
2
1
1
2
1:
6.80
(0.038)
2:
7.12
(0.200)
3:
7.60
(0.200)
4:
8.14*
(0.043)
5:
6.80
(0.343)
6:
0.000***
(0.000)
1:
6.65
(0.952)
2:
6.72
(1.33)
3:
7.35
(0.847)
4:
7.30
(0.612)
5:
6.44
(0.606)
6:
5.38
(0.672)
1:
9.33
(0.354)
2:
10.09
(0.398)
3:
10.86
(0.442)
4:
11.62
(0.486)
5:
12.30
(0.627)
6:
5.52***
(5.98)
1:
8.96
(0.052)
2:
9.68
(0.056)
3:
10.38
(0.013)
4:
11.07
(0.078)
5:
11.58
(0.115)
6:
11.96
(0.110)
1:
12.59
(0.154)
2:
13.60
(0.197)
3:
14.62
(0.240)
4:
15.63
(0.284)
5:
16.13
(2.67)
6:
16.78
(3.45)
1:
12.55
(0.000)
2:
13.56
(0.000)
3:
14.56
(0.000)
4:
15.56
(0.000)
5:
16.57
(0.000)
6:
17.57
(0.000)
3
4
1:
7.03***
(1.74)
2:
6.54**
(2.15)
3:
5.60
(0.795)
4:
4.92*
(1.17)
5:
2.51***
(1.67)
6:
1.62***
(1.50)
1:
5.11
(2.70)
2:
5.27
(3.53)
3:
5.43
(3.36)
4:
5.76
(3.35)
5:
6.74
(2.79)
6:
6.96
(2.49)
1:
8.22***
(1.10)
2:
7.88***
(1.79)
3:
6.98
(1.14)
4:
5.42*
(1.55)
5:
2.12***
(1.80)
6:
2.16***
(1.35)
1:
5.82
(2.01)
2:
5.97
(2.92)
3:
6.47
(2.90)
4:
6.35
(3.33)
5:
5.44
(2.88)
6:
5.70
(2.09)
1:
8.85***
(0.848)
2:
9.14***
(1.25)
3:
8.23***
(1.97)
4:
5.44**
(2.42)
5:
2.88***
(2.00)
6:
1.59***
(1.50)
1:
5.49
(0.973)
2:
5.96
(1.16)
3:
6.09
(1.18)
4:
7.10
(1.25)
5:
7.24
(0.986)
6:
7.64
(1.10)
1
1:
7.32***
(1.76)
2:
8.38***
(2.60)
3:
7.46**
(2.70)
4:
8.04**
(2.76)
5:
1.62***
(2.01)
6:
3.18***
(0.572)
1:
5.16
(2.85)
2:
5.78
(3.45)
3:
6.10
(3.68)
4:
6.28
(3.74)
5:
5.90
(3.49)
6:
6.78
(2.97)
1:
7.66***
(1.60)
2:
8.60***
(2.73)
3:
7.10**
(2.90)
4:
7.38*
(3.08)
5:
1.96***
(2.31)
6:
3.30***
(0.714)
1:
4.93
(2.72)
2:
5.25
(3.25)
3:
5.52
(3.75)
4:
6.34
(3.52)
5:
6.66
(3.37)
6:
6.59
(3.15)
1:
7.52***
(1.59)
2:
8.02***
(2.89)
3:
7.68***
(3.01)
4:
7.24*
(3.14)
5:
2.20***
(2.71)
6:
3.34***
(0.751)
1:
4.81
(2.47)
2:
4.72
(3.23)
3:
5.33
(3.52)
4:
6.56
(3.27)
5:
6.40
(3.30)
6:
6.67
(2.99)
Table 3.12: Payos for Expertise Heterogeneity
Structure Properties
Also for the specic heterogeneous valuation pattern dened in (3.5), the
analytical result of Proposition 29 is conrmed by the simulation outcomes.
For # = 1 and  = 12 : 68 of the 100 simulated pairwise stable networks
consist of the disjoint pair components 1-2, 3-4, and 5-6. Moreover, all
other pairwise stable networks also only consist of pairs that do not link
the extremely valuated agents to each other: 1-2, 3-5, 4-6 (14); 1-3, 2-4, 5-6
(13); and 1-3, 2-5, 4-6 (5). It is clear that agent 2 even more often than with
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valuation pattern (3.4) forms a pair with the most highly valuated agent.
For each parameter setting, the average density and the standard devia-
tion of the simulated pairwise stable and locally ecient networks are given
in Table 3.13.
\ 0 1
2
1
1
2
0.267 0.333 0.856* 0.717 0.977 0.920
(0.000) (0.000) (0.121) (0.032) (0.085) (0.027)
3
4
0.200 0.245 0.200 0.263 0.200* 0.333
(0.000) (0.031) (0.000) (0.016) (0.000) (0.000)
1 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.202 0.200 0.209
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.011) (0.000) 0.022
Table 3.13: Densities for Expertise Heterogeneity with Expert
The density values thus are very low due to the combination of expertise
heterogeneity and expert: for # = 34  1 the pairwise stable networks only
consist of disjoint pairs. Furthermore, the basic intuition that increasing #
implies decreasing density is partly conrmed by the simulation outcomes
as well as the intuition about the positive eect of  on density.
For each parameter setting, the average relative centrality and the stan-
dard deviation of all agents in the simulated pairwise stable and locally
ecient networks are given in Table 3.14.
Similarly to the case without expert, decreasing # leads to more centrality
for the expert and less centrality for the lowest valued agent rst, after which
the density increases further such that these centralities become closer again.
Also  again does not have a consistent eect on expert centrality.
We nd that the centralization of the expert is no longer noteworthily
higher in the pairwise stable than in the locally ecient networks as in Sec-
tion 3.5.3, but other dierences between pairwise stable and locally ecient
structures can be identied: in most cases the dierence in relative cen-
tralization between most and least highly valued non-experts is higher for
the pairwise stable networks (# = 12 ; = 0
1
2 and # =
3
4), like in the case
of heterogeneity without expert (Table 3.9). In the following example we
illustrate one of these cases.
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\ 0 1
2
1
1
2
1:
0.925
(0.159)
2:
-0.125
(0.000)
3:
-0.125
(0.000)
4:
-0.121
(0.037)
5:
-0.125
(0.000)
6:
-0.429**
(0.147)
1:
1.00
(0.000)
2:
-0.200
(0.000)
3:
-0.200
(0.000)
4:
-0.200
(0.000)
5:
-0.200
(0.000)
6:
-0.200
(0.000)
1:
0.054*
(0.029)
2:
0.054
(0.029)
3:
0.039
(0.053)
4:
0.034
(0.058)
5:
0.014
(0.071)
6:
-0.196
(0.194)
1:
0.199
(0.032)
2:
0.066
(0.057)
3:
-0.015
(0.059)
4:
-0.037
(0.057)
5:
-0.078
(0.021)
6:
-0.135
(0.056)
1:
0.007
(0.026)
2:
0.007
(0.026)
3:
0.007
(0.026)
4:
0.007
(0.026)
5:
0.007
(0.026)
6:
-0.035
(0.128)
1:
0.044
(0.016)
2:
0.044
(0.016)
3:
0.021
(0.030)
4:
0.021
(0.030)
5:
-0.065
(0.013)
6:
-0.065
(0.013)
3
4
1:
0.395*
(0.204)
2:
0.000
(0.000)
3:
0.000
(0.000)
4:
0.000
(0.000)
5:
0.000
(0.000)
6:
-0.395***
(0.204)
1:
0.295
(0.258)
2:
-0.009
(0.141)
3:
-0.061
(0.098)
4:
-0.065
(0.093)
5:
-0.076
(0.075)
6:
-0.084
(0.059)
1:
0.425
(0.179)
2:
0.000
(0.000)
3:
0.000
(0.000)
4:
0.000
(0.000)
5:
0.000
(0.000)
6:
-0.425***
(0.179)
1:
0.370
(0.200)
2:
-0.054
(0.141)
3:
-0.058
(0.137)
4:
-0.069
(0.127)
5:
-0.076
(0.118)
6:
-0.114
(0.047)
1:
0.500
(0.000)
2:
0.000
(0.000)
3:
0.000
(0.000)
4:
0.000
(0.000)
5:
0.000*
(0.000)
6:
-0.500***
(0.000)
1:
0.433
(0.094)
2:
-0.029
(0.149)
3:
-0.074
(0.148)
4:
-0.059
(0.150)
5:
-0.137
(0.122)
6:
-0.134
(0.124)
1
1:
0.000
(0.000)
2:
0.000
(0.000)
3:
0.000
(0.000)
4:
0.000
(0.000)
5:
0.000
(0.000)
6:
0.000
(0.000)
1:
0.000
(0.000)
2:
0.000
(0.000)
3:
0.000
(0.000)
4:
0.000
(0.000)
5:
0.000
(0.000)
6:
0.000
(0.000)
1:
0.000
(0.000)
2:
0.000
(0.000)
3:
0.000
(0.000)
4:
0.000
(0.000)
5:
0.000
(0.000)
6:
0.000
(0.000)
1:
0.093
(0.189)
2:
-0.004
(0.021)
3:
-0.004
(0.021)
4:
-0.004
(0.021)
5:
-0.004
(0.021)
6:
-0.078
(0.196)
1:
0.000
(0.000)
2:
0.000
(0.000)
3:
0.000
(0.000)
4:
0.000
(0.000)
5:
0.000
(0.000)
6:
0.000
(0.000)
1:
0.063
(0.139)
2:
-0.001
(0.062)
3:
-0.001
(0.062)
4:
-0.016
(0.042)
5:
-0.016
(0.042)
6:
-0.028
(0.136)
Table 3.14: Centralities for Expertise Heterogeneity with Expert
Example 31 Let # = 34 ,  =
1
2 , then Table 3.15 provides an overview of the
types and numbers of pairwise stable networks resulting from 100 simulations
and the types and numbers of locally ecient networks resulting from another
100 simulations.
Thus, in the pairwise stable networks agent 6 is relatively isolated, where-
as in the locally ecient networks she is more equally centralized to the other
non-experts.
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pairwise stable networks
85
15
locally ecient networks
58 6
36
Table 3.15: Example of Structures for Expertise Heterogeneity with Expert
Payo Properties
As a means to investigate in how far the structure dierences between the
locally ecient and pairwise stable networks actually lead to welfare dif-
ferences, for each parameter setting, the average welfare and the standard
deviation of the simulated pairwise stable and locally ecient networks are
given in Table 3.16.
\ 0 1
2
1
1
2
48.45* 53.67 r 33.5 61.60 64.46 r 50.0 89.48 90.42 r 67.1
(1.20) (0.000) m 53.7 (3.37) (0.142) m 64.8 (3.245) (0.130) m 90.5
3
4
35.47 36.87 r 21.1 36.78 38.40 r 26.1 38.51 41.27 r 31.1
(0.275) (1.11) m 39.3 (0.327) (1.13) m 40.4 (0.000) (0.466) m 42.2
1 36.00 36.00 r 13.7 36.00 35.18 r 15.2 36.00 35.48 r 16.9
(0.000) (0.000) m 36.0 (0.000) (1.66) m 36.0 (0.000) (1.10) m 36.0
Table 3.16: Welfare for Expertise Heterogeneity with Expert
Except for # = 1, we again nd that a higher  and thus more value
transferability leads to higher welfare. Therefore, also in a heterogeneous
setting with an expert, stimulating the focus on informational value in the
community is an eective tool for boosting welfare. Furthermore, also in
this setting a lower # only leads to subsequent higher welfare when link
specicity is low enough.
The structure dierences do only lead to a small tension between overall
local eciency and pairwise stability for # = 12 
3
4 (until 10% for # =
1
2 ,
 = 0). Comparing Tables 3.11 and 3.16, adding an expert to a heteroge-
neous community appears to be a less eective tool to increase welfare for
intermediate link specicity than in case of a homogeneous community.
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Again we also look at the individual payos in the dierent parameter
settings to study equity issues. For each parameter setting, the average
individual payo and the standard deviation of all agents in the simulated
pairwise stable and locally ecient networks are given in Table 3.17.
\ 0 1
2
1
1
2
1:
6.98
(0.068)
2:
10.84*
(0.742)
3:
10.84*
(0.742)
4:
10.71*
(1.06)
5:
8.71
(3.71)
6:
0.381***
(0.787)
1:
6.71
(0.000)
2:
9.39
(0.000)
3:
9.39
(0.000)
4:
9.39
(0.000)
5:
9.39
(0.000)
6:
9.39
(0.000)
1:
5.44
(0.121)
2:
11.38
(0.443)
3:
11.72
(0.484)
4:
12.08
(0.512)
5:
12.42
(0.557)
6:
8.56**
(5.47)
1:
5.72
(0.049)
2:
11.47
(0.182)
3:
11.65
(0.157)
4:
11.72
(0.227)
5:
11.99
(0.177)
6:
11.91
(0.262)
1:
7.55
(0.060)
2:
15.64
(0.275)
3:
16.15
(0.288)
4:
16.65
(0.301)
5:
17.16
(0.315)
6:
16.34
(4.48)
1:
7.67
(0.021)
2:
15.98
(0.118)
3:
16.34
(0.189)
4:
16.83
(0.237)
5:
16.60
(0.075)
6:
16.99
(0.082)
3
4
1:
5.28***
(0.143)
2:
14.27***
(3.47)
3:
10.49***
(3.86)
4:
2.42***
(0.815)
5:
2.58***
(0.815)
6:
0.42***
(0.815)
1:
3.39
(1.15)
2:
6.61
(5.80)
3:
6.34
(5.01)
4:
6.09
(4.59)
5:
7.14
(5.81)
6:
7.30
(5.20)
1:
5.30***
(0.125)
2:
14.36***
(2.79)
3:
11.82***
(3.70)
4:
2.30***
(0.714)
5:
2.70***
(0.714)
6:
0.300***
(0.714)
1:
3.77
(0.901)
2:
7.37
(5.61)
3:
6.93
(4.53)
4:
7.15
(4.43)
5:
6.26
(4.21)
6:
6.93
(4.39)
1:
5.35***
(0.000)
2:
13.90***
(0.000)
3:
14.25***
(0.000)
4:
2.00***
(0.000)
5:
3.00***
(0.000)
6:
0.000***
(0.000)
1:
3.74
(0.530)
2:
7.07
(2.04)
3:
7.30
(2.03)
4:
7.54
(2.06)
5:
7.40
(2.31)
6:
8.22
(2.24)
1
1:
4.66***
(0.570)
2:
15.77***
(8.19)
3:
7.30
(7.72)
4:
4.49***
(4.00)
5:
1.60***
(1.30)
6:
2.18***
(0.384)
1:
3.39
(1.36)
2:
8.00
(8.37)
3:
6.82
(7.44)
4:
6.95
(7.58)
5:
5.48
(6.90)
6:
5.36
(5.88)
1:
4.82***
(0.384)
2:
17.71***
(7.02)
3:
6.10
(6.99)
4:
3.56***
(1.28)
5:
1.62***
(1.29)
6:
2.19***
(0.392)
1:
3.39
(1.39)
2:
8.32
(7.87)
3:
6.15
(6.31)
4:
5.91
(7.01)
5:
6.13
(6.20)
6:
5.29
(6.51)
1:
4.83***
(0.376)
2:
17.93***
(6.78)
3:
5.85*
(6.87)
4:
3.50***
(1.37)
5:
1.67***
(1.27)
6:
2.22***
(0.414)
1:
3.04
(1.30)
2:
5.58
(6.64)
3:
7.06
(7.40)
4:
7.10
(7.01)
5:
6.28
(6.30)
6:
6.42
(6.80)
Table 3.17: Payos for Expertise Heterogeneity with Expert
We nd that on the individual level there are considerable payo dif-
ferences between pairwise stable and locally ecient networks: except for
# = 12 ,  = 1, the dierence between the payo of the most and least highly
valued non-experts is much higher in the pairwise stable networks than in the
locally ecient ones. Therefore, also with expert social preferences would
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be more benecial to equity than to eciency. Moreover, comparing Tables
3.12 and 3.17, adding an expert to a heterogeneous community does by far
not resolve inequity. This can be explained by the eect that in case of ex-
pertise heterogeneity, more similarly valuated agents tend to form disjoint
pairs with each other, which leads to an extreme payo for the agent who is
most highly valuated after the expert. Only in case of higher density (due
to small link specicity plus value transferability), all agents benet from
the presence of the expert.
3.6 Discussion
In this chapter we studied the structure and eciency of bilateral commu-
nication links by simulating a game-theoretic model of network formation
for three levels of link specicity - the extent that having to maintain more
direct links leads to each link’s decrease in value -, three levels of focus on
informational versus social value from communication, and four patterns of
valuation heterogeneity: homogeneity and expertise heterogeneity, each with
and without the presence of one especially highly valued expert. We have
illustrated that the structure properties of pairwise stable networks heavily
depend on these parameter values, which results in eciency and equity dif-
ferences among settings. Therefore, in this section we open the discussion
on measurement and management of these important parameters.
3.6.1 Measurement
First of all it is important for a manager to assess the valuation pattern in
her community. For example, the eects of adding an expert to a community
depend on whether the rest of the community is homogeneous (Section 3.5.3)
or not (Section 3.5.5). An obvious way to measure this is via a credit point or
ranking system as present in many online communities nowadays (e.g., hp’s
IT resource center forums). A complicating factor of such a system is that
the possibility to judge other members’ performance might itself be a cause
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of heterogeneity, for it visualizes and stimulates some members’ performance
eorts. Therefore, it may be necessary to derive the level of heterogeneity
from more objective community measures like message exchange or to send
out a questionnaire to a random sample from the members.
Furthermore, the level of focus on informational versus social value from
communication () is crucial for payo properties of the resulting network
structure. In this chapter, where 
 i = 

s
 	 	   :  6= 	 more fo-
cus on informational value was generally benecial for community welfare.
However, we know from Chapter 2 that this is no longer guaranteed for any
ratio between informational and social value (Section 2.4.3). Also for this,
parameter estimates might be derived from objective community statistics
like the use of common technical terms (e.g., numbers) versus the use of
common social support terms (e.g., emoticons), or via a questionnaire.
Finally, the level of specicity in the community is a managerially rele-
vant parameter. It may be relatively easy to determine whether specicity is
higher in one community or another, since it is possible to compare via mes-
sage exchange or a questionnaire how much eort members have to put into
making their contributions valuable for specic other members. Probably
it is more dicult to estimate absolute values of the parameter #, reecting
how exactly these eort levels aect payos when members have to maintain
an increasing number of links. However, it is important for a manager to
know this, because for example in Section 3.5.2 it was illustrated that en-
hancing communication in the community by decreasing link specicity does
not always lead to higher welfare from communication. A solution could be
to nd the current level of # - after measuring the other important para-
meter values - by backward induction from the structure properties of the
community network. E.g., for a homogeneous valuation pattern, complete
structures point out a # value of at most12 and fragmented pair structures a
# value of at least 1.
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3.6.2 Management
Depending on the measurement issues as discussed above, the current chap-
ter suggests several community management tools to aect the value that
members derive from communication.
As already discussed in Section 2.4.3 of Chapter 2, the informational
versus social orientation () could be inuenced by modifying moderator
tasks, entry policy, rules of conduct, and reward systems, hereby emphasi-
zing informational versus social value.
By reward systems and especially by adding an expert to the community,
managers can aect the value derived from communication eectively via
the community’s valuation pattern. Also, there may be ways to inuence #,
for example by technically simplifying the process of dealing with multiple
communication links.
The local eciency results of Section 3.5 illustrated that in several para-
meter settings, social preferences in the sense that members use community
welfare as their objective function rather than their own payo can enhance
welfare or equity to a consequential extent. Therefore, in Chapter 4 it will be
investigated whether people take others’ payo into account when making
network formation decisions.
3.6.3 Further Research
These simulation studies furthermore illustrate the interest of economic,
structure analysis of communication. Follow-up studies can investigate the
eects of an agent who is given incentives by the community manager to
serve welfare rather than own payo. Preliminary simulations indicate that
this will lead to more ecient pairwise stable networks, even if this special
agent is not an expert in the sense that other community members derive
more value from communication with her.
Moreover, more complex forms of valuation heterogeneity can be ex-
plored. As already mentioned before, the condition 
 i = 

s
 	 	   :
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 6= 	 could be dropped, resulting in other eects of  Also, besides exper-
tise heterogeneity as studied here - agents represent dierent values for their
fellow customers - it is possible to study judgement heterogeneity, where
agents have dierent opinions on the values of their fellow customers. Pre-
liminary simulations indicate that this leads to agent permutations rather
than structure dierences. For example, if # = 1, the pairwise stable struc-
tures in case of judgement heterogeneity still only consist of pairs, but the
likelihood that agents 1 and 2 form one of these pairs changes.
In addition, it is possible to derive more general analytical results like in
Chapter 2 also for #-values other than 1. In particular for the other extreme
case simulated here, i.e., # = 12  it would be interesting to characterize the
conditions in which the complete network is the only pairwise stable network.
The managerial implication practice of aecting parameters of the model
might bring up other ways of controlling the welfare and equity of commu-
nities asking for further research. Empirical testing forms an alternative
promising area.
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Chapter 4
The Behavioral Aspect:
An Experimental
Investigation
Network formation constitutes an important part of many social and eco-
nomic processes, but relatively little is known about how individuals make
their linking decisions. This chapter provides an experimental investiga-
tion of behavioral eects in individual decisions of network formation. Our
ndings demonstrate that individuals systematically simplify more complex
components of network payo in their linking decisions. Specically, they
focus on only part of the normative payo, namely on their own direct pay-
o and tend to ignore indirect payo and payo for others in the network.
Additionally, individuals use descriptive behavioral traits of link choice alter-
natives to guide their choices. They are sensitive to whether an alternative
involves link deletion or creation and whether it concerns an isolated or a
central node. Furthermore, we nd that complexity of one type can moderate
individuals’ dealing with a complex feature of another type. These behavioral
eects have important implications for researchers and managers working in
areas that involve network formation.
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4.1 Introduction
Network formation among individuals is an important phenomenon in many
social and economic contexts, ranging from word-of-mouth communications
among consumers (e.g., Iacobucci and Hopkins 1992) and social structure
(e.g., Granovetter 1995) to intra-organization communication (e.g., Van den
Bulte and Moenaert 1998) and virtual communities (e.g., Wellman et al.
1996).
There exists a recent and increasing literature in which researchers ex-
perimentally investigate the network formation process. One stream in this
literature is involved with testing integral game-theoretical models of net-
work formation. They include variants of Bala and Goyal’s (2000) noncoope-
rative network formation model (e.g., Berninghaus et al. 2006, Callander
and Plott 2005), Jackson and Wolinsky’s (1996) pairwise cooperative net-
work formation model (e.g., Deck and Johnson 2004), and fully cooperative
network formation models like Jackson and Van den Nouweland’s (2005)
(e.g., Charness and Jackson 2006). This research identies several condi-
tions under which theoretically stable network structures are reproduced
in the laboratory and addresses these networks’ eciency. Another stream
of experimental studies examines the role of network formation as endoge-
nously emerging in other relevant settings of cooperative decision making
(e.g., Brown et al. 2004, Corbae and Duy 2007, Hauk and Nagel 2001,
Kirchsteiger et al. 2005). This research shows that cooperation decisions
are considerably inuenced when individuals are allowed to choose their
partners versus when an interaction structure is imposed.
A common factor in this previous empirical investigation of the network
formation process is that individual benets and costs are given by a payo
function tailored to the specic game-theoretical setting. Therefore, an issue
that has been largely ignored is that the complexity of the network formation
decisions that individuals face may cause errors or simplications in their
choice process. Although previous research acknowledged the mere existence
of errors (e.g., McKelvey and Palfrey 1995, Charness and Jackson 2006),
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the underlying process remains undisclosed. The objective of the current
chapter is to investigate such behavioral shifts in individual decision making
in networks as a function of typical network complexity features. In parti-
cular, we examine whether individuals use simplifying heuristics in dealing
with network complexity, similarly to how they use simplifying heuristics in
previously studied choice contexts (Johnson and Payne 1985).
We perform an individual decision making experiment in which we vary
three complexity features that are relevant in the context of network for-
mation, i.e., structural complexity of the network, transferability of value in
the network, and social tradeo between one’s own payo and others’ payo.
These properties complicate the choices that individuals make about crea-
ting and maintaining links in the network. We examine whether they aect
individuals’ use of simplifying heuristics. We investigate whether complex
network features are represented in a simplied form in the individual deci-
sion process, and how complexity of one type can moderate the individual
handling of a complex feature of another type.
In general, we investigate whether individuals cope with complexity by
attribute substitution, i.e., assessing the target attribute of a judgment ob-
ject by substituting a property of the object that is more accessible, i.e.,
comes more readily to mind (Gilovich et al. 2002, Kahneman 2003). In-
dividuals may thus simplify the network formation decision process in two
ways. First, they substitute the exact payo value of a link choice alter-
native by descriptive attributes that are related to this value, e.g., whether
a linking alternative involves link deletion or creation and whether it con-
cerns an isolated or a central node. Second, they focus relatively strongly
on the value they derive from their direct neighbors rather than indirect
neighbors and they put less weight on the payos that others receive. We
examine whether these two types of heuristics are more heavily used in more
complex settings.
In order to test our hypotheses, we confront participants in the lab with
multiple static, non-interactive network situations in which they can choose
to create or delete one link or to do nothing. Such a network situation
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constitutes one of the simplest network linking decision contexts, which al-
lows us to study the eects of network complexity under highly controlled
experimental conditions. In more complex network tasks, like the strategic
situations as commonly studied in the current experimental network for-
mation literature, the proposed complexity eects are also likely to play a
signicant role, but it would be much harder to disentangle each compo-
nent’s separate eect.
The participants’ choices have a direct impact on their monetary re-
wards in the experiment and dier with respect to the three complexity
factors (structural complexity, value transferability, social tradeo), leading
to dierent treatments. We perform a comprehensive parametric test of
the hypotheses by estimating a mixed (i.e., random parameters) logit model
(McFadden 2001, Hensher et al. 2005). This allows us to investigate the
impact of important complex network properties on individuals’ decisions,
while allowing for heterogeneity of the decision makers.
In Section 4.2, we present our theoretical framework, leading to hypothe-
ses on behavioral eects in network linking decision making that dier from
prior predictions based on full rationality. Section 4.3 describes the experi-
mental design and the approach used for the mixed logit estimations. The
results of our experiment and hypotheses tests are reported in Section 4.4.
Section 4.5 concludes the chapter with discussion.
4.2 Theoretical Framework
The objective of this section is to present our hypotheses about behavioral
eects in individual decisions of network formation and compare them to
predictions on individual choice behavior underlying the previous experi-
mental network formation literature. After a description of our setting, the
predictions based on prior theories are reviewed in Section 4.2.1 and our
hypotheses are presented in Section 4.2.2.
The focus of our research is to investigate individuals’ behavioral res-
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ponse to variations in network complexity. We address the elementary case
of single link formation decisions by individuals. Doing so allows us to
investigate complexity eects in a tightly controlled yet relevant setting of
network formation decisions. To prevent possible confounding eects that do
not originate from network complexity but from strategic interaction among
individuals, we focus on individual one-period decisions. Thus a typical
decision task as we study it would be described as follows. An individual
(“you” in the example of Figure 4.1) is connected with several other nodes
in a network and is facing the one-shot choice problem to change at most
one link: her options are to delete one of her existing links (a or d in the
example), to create a link with one node that she is currently not directly
connected to (b or c in the example), or not to change anything. Her payo
entirely depends on the network structure after completion of her choice.
Figure 4.1: Example
4.2.1 Prior Utility Models of Network Formation Decisions
Economic theory traditionally models the utility that individual  derives
from choosing alternative 	 as:
  = 
(Payo)
where Payo is the payo experienced by individual  when she chooses
alternative 	 and   is a strictly increasing function.
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Social preferences theory (for an overview see Fehr and Schmidt 2003)
augments this model by allowing for the fact that in addition to their own
payo, individuals may take the payo for other individuals into account
when making their decisions. In this case, the utility that individual  derives
from choosing alternative 	 is given by:
  = 
(OwnPayo 
³
OthersPayo (&)
´
 6=
)
where OwnPayo is the payo personally experienced by individual  when
she chooses alternative 	 OthersPayo(&) is the payo experienced by an-
other individual & when individual  chooses alternative 	, and   () is a
function reecting how individual  holds others-oriented payo components
in mind (e.g., inequity aversion, eciency preferences, etc.).
4.2.2 Hypotheses
Our claim is that these prior utility models are not sucient in explaining
link choice behavior in the presence of network complexity. As humans
have bounded rationality (Loasby 1976, Simon 1979, Camerer 1998), they
cope with complexity in decision making by using simplifying heuristics,
which commonly involve assessing a judgment object (e.g., linking choice
alternative) using only the subset of properties of the object that are most
accessible, i.e., that come most readily to mind, rather than using all relevant
properties (Gilovich et al. 2002, Kahneman 2003, Gigerenzer et al. 1999).
For example, when faced with a choice that is hard to resolve, people often
search for a compelling rationale for choosing one alternative over another
(Shar et al. 1993). This is clearly illustrated in the literature about the
eects of task complexity in several other contexts, like audit judgment (e.g.,
Bonner 1994) and consumer choice (e.g., Swait and Adamowicz 2001), but
no research to date has addressed simplication rules that individuals use
in making complex network formation decisions.
In the next subsections, we propose two main types of simplifying heuris-
tics that individuals use in making linking decisions: (i) they employ de-
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scriptive properties of the choice alternatives besides their normative payo
properties and (ii) they focus on only the most easily accessible parts of the
normative payo properties. Furthermore, we examine whether both forms
of simplication are stronger under more complex network decision making
conditions.
Descriptive Traits
In the network formation setting the decision maker’s payo depends on
the network structure after completion of her choice, where having more
connections is on the one hand benecial, since they provide access to ad-
ditional resources, and on the other hand costly, for it takes time and eort
to maintain them. It is typically a complex task for individuals to judge the
exact payo of link choice alternatives and we examine whether individu-
als use simplifying heuristics. A similar psychological process of judgment
simplication is encountered in the literature about Conjunctive Probabi-
lity Assessment, which shows that individuals make predictions based on a
correlation they assume to exist between the assessment variable and some
other variable (e.g., Broniarczyk & Alba 1994).
Accordingly, we investigate whether individuals partly substitute the
normative payo value of a link choice alternative by descriptive attributes
that can be determined more easily and that are qualitatively related to it.
In particular, individuals can relatively easily see that there is a tradeo be-
tween benets and costs of more connections. Consequently, we hypothesize
that they use as heuristic attributes (i) whether a link choice alternative
involves link deletion or creation, and (ii) whether it concerns an isolated
node, i.e., a node without direct links, or a central node, i.e., a node with
three or more direct links. This is in line with Qualitative Process Theory,
which suggests that human reasoning is more likely to depend on qualitative
rather than quantitative relations (Forbus 1993). Therefore, it is examined
whether individuals use the type of action or node as behavioral cues rather
than the expected payo.
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Summarizing, we can formulate the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 (eects of descriptive traits on link choice) An indivi-
dual’s network formation choices are aected by descriptive traits of link
choice alternatives, i.e., whether an alternative involves link deletion (-) or
creation (+), and whether it concerns an isolated node (+) or a central node
(-).
Thus, the hypothesized eects of creation and deletion are based on the
qualitative benets of links, whereas the hypothesized eects of isolated and
central nodes are based on the qualitative costs of links. Pursuing this line
of reasoning, we formulate the utility that individual  derives from choosing
alternative 	 with the following behavioral cues:
  = 

¡
Payo Delete Create Central  Isolated
¢
 (4.1)
where Payo is the payo experienced by individual  when she chooses
alternative 	 and Delete  Create  Central  and Isolated are dummy vari-
ables indicating by 1 that alternative 	 involves link deletion, link creation,
a link with a central node, and a link with an isolated node, respectively.
The function   decreases in Delete and Central  and increases in Create
and Isolated 
Shifts in Payo Traits
Direct versus Indirect Payo An important aspect of complexity in a
network setting is that there can be value transferability, implying that an
individual derives value not only from her direct neighbors, but also from her
neighbors’ neighbors, etc. (e.g., Bala and Goyal 2000, Jackson and Wolinsky
1996). This makes it more complex for individuals to judge the exact value
of link choice alternatives, because besides evaluating the direct payo of
each link, they also have to be forward-looking over indirect links.
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Our hypothesis is that individuals tend to simplify by focusing most
strongly on the payo aspect that can be determined most easily: the value
that is derived from direct neighbors only. The tendency to discount items
in the utility function that are relatively more distant is known from research
about time discounting (e.g., Frederick et al. 2002). Closely related to our
hypothesis of network-shortsightedness are ndings of spatial discounting,
i.e., weighting spatially close features more strongly in the utility function
than spatially distant features (e.g., Hannon 1994, Levinthal and March
1993).
Therefore, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 2 (eects of indirect payo on link choice) An individu-
al’s network formation choices are aected less strongly by payo she derives
from indirect nodes (+) than by payo from direct nodes (+).
We capture this second proposed behavioral eect as follows in the utility
that individual  derives from choosing alternative 	:
  = 

¡
DirectPayo  IndirectPayo

 Delete Create Central  Isolated
¢

(4.2)
where DirectPayo is the payo experienced by individual  from her di-
rect neighbors when she chooses alternative 	 IndirectPayo = Payo


DirectPayo  and 
 increases in IndirectPayo but more so in DirectPayo

 .
Own versus Others’ Payo Social tradeo is a further complicating
factor in the network setting, implying that an individual’s choices not only
aect her own value, but also her neighbors’ (and her neighbors’ neighbors,
etc.) (e.g., Bala and Goyal 2000, Jackson and Wolinsky 1996). This aspect
of network formation choices makes it more complex for individuals with
social preferences to judge the exact value of link choice alternatives, because
besides their own payo they also have to consider the payo of (possibly
many) other individuals.
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Similarly to our investigation with respect to how individuals simplify the
complexity of having to deal with indirect payo, we also investigate whether
individuals deal with the complexity of social tradeo by focusing on the
payo aspect that can be determined most easily. In this case we examine
whether individuals tend to focus more strongly on their own payo and will
pay relatively less attention to others’ payo due to the greater complexity of
evaluating this social payo. In the past, behavioral economists have found
empirical evidence for social preferences, but mainly in lab environments
where choice complexity was largely mitigated by explicit payo information,
which presents participants with the numerical payo consequences of their
choice options. However, Charness et al. (2004) have shown that individuals’
social choices are aected by the variation of complexity resulting from such
a comprehensive payo overview.
Thus, we propose the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3 (eects of others’ payo on link choice) An individu-
al’s network formation choices are aected less strongly by their payo con-
sequences for other individuals (+) when she is provided with a complete
description of how the payos depend on these choices than when she is
provided with a numerical payo overview (+).
We include this third behavioral eect in the utility that individual 
derives from choosing alternative 	 as follows:
  = 

¡
OwnDirectPayo OwnIndirectPayo

  (4.3)³
OthersDirectPayo (&)
´
 6=

³
OthersIndirectPayo (&)
´
 6=

Delete Create Central  Isolated) 
where OwnDirectPayo is the payo personally experienced by individual 
from her direct neighbors when she chooses alternative 	OwnIndirectPayo
is the payo personally experienced from indirect nodes, OthersDirectPay-
o(&) is the payo experienced by another individual & from her direct
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neighbors when individual  chooses alternative 	 OthersIndirectPayo(&)
is the payo experienced by another individual from indirect nodes, and  
is a function less increasing in
³
OthersPayo (&)
´
 6=
when individual  does
not receive an explicit payo overview than when she does.
Complexity Conditions
Finally, we hypothesize that the dierent complexity aspects of networks
may strengthen individuals’ tendency to rely on the proposed heuristics. We
include these moderating eects of complexity in the utility that individual
 derives from choosing alternative 	 as follows:
  = 

¡
OwnDirectPayo OwnIndirectPayo

  (4.4)³
OthersDirectPayo (&)
´
 6=

³
OthersIndirectPayo (&)
´
 6=

Delete Create Central  Isolated 
Complexity × ¡OwnDirectPayo OwnIndirectPayo ³
OthersDirectPayo (&)
´
 6=

³
OthersIndirectPayo (&)
´
 6=

Delete Create Central  Isolated)) 
where Complexity is the network choice complexity that individual  is
facing and   is a function in which the interaction eects with Complexity
are included.
Structural Complexity First, we examine whether structural comple-
xity in the network formation context aects decision making in a similar
way as task complexity in the consumer choice context (e.g., Johnson and
Payne 1985). More specically, we investigate whether changes in structural
features like increases in the number of nodes (and thus choice alternatives)
in the network, will strengthen individuals’ use of heuristics in terms of more
strongly focusing on the role of descriptive traits in the utility function and
relying more strongly on payo function simplications. In our analysis we
focus on the feature connected position (i.e., the decision maker is linked
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to the network herself, like “you” in the example of Figure 4.1) as an im-
portant aspect of structural complexity, which makes it more dicult for
the individual to assess the consequences of changes in the status quo and
thus link choice alternatives. Specically, if an individual is not connected
to other agents, her current payo is trivially equal to zero and link deletion
is not possible. As a consequence, she only has to assess the payos for
link creation with any of the other agents. This brings us to the following
hypotheses:
Hypothesis 4 (moderating eects of structural complexity)
Hypothesis 4.1 Structural complexity increases the impact of the descrip-
tive traits of link choice alternatives (i.e., whether an alternative involves
link deletion or creation and whether it concerns an isolated node or a cen-
tral node) on link choice.
Hypothesis 4.2 Structural complexity decreases the impact of indirect pay-
o on link choice.
Hypothesis 4.3 Structural complexity decreases the impact of others’ pay-
o on link choice.
Value Transferability Another network feature regarded here is value
transferability, which refers to the fact that an individual derives value not
only from her direct neighbors, but also indirectly from her neighbors’ neigh-
bors, etc. (cf. Section 4.2.2). This network property makes it more complex
for individuals to judge the exact value of link choice alternatives, because
they have to be forward-looking over indirect links. Value transferability
therefore not only enables the heuristic of focusing on the part of the nor-
mative value that concerns payo derived from direct neighbors, but further-
more stimulates the use of the other heuristics. This leads to the following
hypotheses:
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Hypothesis 5 (moderating eects of value transferability)
Hypothesis 5.1 Value transferability increases the impact of the descrip-
tive traits of link choice alternatives (i.e., whether an alternative involves
link deletion or creation and whether it concerns an isolated node or a cen-
tral node) on link choice.
Hypothesis 5.2 Value transferability decreases the impact of others’ payo
on link choice.
Social Tradeo As a nal complexity property, we consider social trade-
o, implying that an individual’s choices not only aect her own value, but
also her neighbors’ (and her neighbors’ neighbors, etc.) (cf. Section 4.2.2).
This network property makes it more complex for individuals with social
preferences to judge the exact value of link choice alternatives, because be-
sides their own payo they have to consider the payo of (possibly many)
other individuals. Therefore, social tradeo not only enables the heuristic
of focusing on the part of the normative value that concerns own payo, but
also has a strengthening eect on the role of the other heuristics. This can
be formulated in the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 6 (moderating eects of social tradeo)
Hypothesis 6.1 Social tradeo increases the impact of the descriptive traits
of link choice alternatives (i.e., whether an alternative involves link deletion
or creation and whether it concerns an isolated node or a central node) on
link choice.
Hypothesis 6.2 Social tradeo decreases the impact of indirect payo on
link choice.
Our hypotheses are illustrated in Figure 4.2. Note that the heuristics
we propose show a positive association with the payo that individuals nor-
matively should base their decisions on. Therefore, although people do not
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optimize their payo, they may still optimize their utility by saving eort
(cf. Gigerenzer et al. 1999).
Figure 4.2: Hypothesized Model
4.3 Methods
In this section we describe the experimental design as well as the parametric
approach used for testing our hypotheses.
4.3.1 Experimental Design
Our experiment presented participants with six choice problems similar to
that in Figure 4.1. In these problems a participant was allowed to change
at most one direct link, i.e., to delete a link that already exists between her
and another node, to create a link between her and another node if there is
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not yet one, or to change nothing. The choice problems are illustrated in
Tables B.2 and B.3, Appendix B.
To test for the hypothesized shifts in heuristic behavior due to value
transferability (equation (4.2) versus equation (4.1)) and social tradeo
(equation (4.3) versus equation (4.1)), we employed four experimental treat-
ments where these two characteristics were the between-subjects factors.
Thus, each participant faced one of four particular complexity conditions
(see Section 4.2.2). The experimental design is summarized by Table 4.1.
A within-subject manipulation for the treatments social and both will be
introduced later in this section.
social tradeo?
NO YES
value NO none social (part 1, part 2)
transferability? YES transfer both (part 1, part 2)
Table 4.1: Experimental Design
Each participant was confronted with a payo function matching her
condition. This function reects the benets and costs of link formation and
was explained in words to the participants in the instructions (see Appendix
A). For a participant  in between-subject treatments none and social there
is no value transferability, so value is derived from direct neighbors only.
The payo function is then given by:
 =
( P

1
· if   0
0 if  = 0
where  is the set of nodes with whom i has a direct link, node j is a
neighbor of i if 	  , and  = || is the number of neighbors of i, the
degree of i.
For between-subject treatments transfer and both there is value transfera-
bility, so value is derived from direct as well as indirectly connected nodes.
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The payo function is then given by:
 =

	
P
¯
P
P
1
· ·

	 
(	)
2 if   0
0 if  = 0
where ¯ is the set of nodes with whom i has either a direct or an indirect
link, P is the set of paths between i and j, where a path is dened as a
sequence of consecutive edges without repeated nodes,  is the set of nodes
on path p between i and j excluding i and j themselves, and  is the degree
of i. In the instructions, these payo functions are not presented in formulas
but in easy verbal descriptions, illustrated by an example (see Appendix A).
For between-subject treatments none and transfer there is no social
tradeo. The participants were informed that nobody else was aected by
their choices. For treatments social and both there is social tradeo. The
participants were informed that the payos for the other nodes in the choice
problems are determined analogously to their own payo, and that the total
payos created for these other nodes due to their choices are divided equally
among the other participants in the room. Thus, a simple form of social
preferences, not regarding distributional issues, was evoked. No informa-
tion or feedback about the tasks and choices of the other participants was
provided during the experiment in order to rule out strategic motivations.
Three of the six problems involve a connected position and the other half
an isolated position for the participant (see Tables B.2 and B.3, Appendix
B1). Thus, the structural complexity characteristic connected position was
included as within-subject factor in the experimental design. The number of
nodes was kept constant in all six choice problems. Pilot studies conducted
by the authors before the experiment indicated that several other structural
complexity features like the exact number of links and the number of visual
crossings between links do not aect participants’ choices. Still, to avoid
biases due to such other structural factors, the order of choice problems was
rotated among participants.
1Note that choice problems 1, 3, and 5 involve a connected start position.
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To control for individual dierences, particularly in social preferences,
for participants in between-subject treatments social and both where payo
for other participants had to be considered, an additional part was added
to the experiment. This was exactly the same as the rst part, but for each
choice option the payo for the participant as well as for the others were
mentioned explicitly. This is illustrated in Figure B.1, Appendix B. Char-
ness, Frechette, and Kagel (2004) showed that people behave dierently in
gift-exchange games when they receive a comprehensive payo table, and
the objective of this additional manipulation is to test in how far partici-
pants take others’ payo into account when the complexity of doing so is
removed. The payos for all choice problems are given in Table B.4 in the
same appendix. Thus, for the between-subject treatments social and both,
payo information was also incorporated as a within-subjects factor.
The experiment took place in a computer lab with students and emplo-
yees of various faculties of Maastricht University, the Netherlands. In each
of the four between-subject conditions there were 28 participants in batches
of 7. After each choice, feedback was given to the participant about the
payo she earned for herself and if relevant for the other participants in
the room, and the maximum and minimum number of points that could
have been earned in the specic choice problem. Participants were informed
how the payos they earn in the experiment are converted into cash euros
afterwards, see Sections A.1 and A.2, Appendix A for details. They could
only start the experiment after answering control questions correctly and
after two really paid-out practice rounds with only three choice alternatives,
see Table B.1, Appendix B. At the end they were asked to comment on the
way they made their choices in a debrieng part.
4.3.2 Mixed Logit Estimations
We perform a comprehensive parametric test of our hypotheses by estimating
a mixed (i.e., random parameters) logit model (Hensher et al. 2005). This
enables us to establish the roles of several attributes of link alternatives
in the network formation process, while allowing for heterogeneity across
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individuals. We assume that (without numerical payo information), the
utility that individual  derives from choosing alternative 	 in choice problem
' is given by:
  =
P
	
(	 ·  	 +
P
	
)	 ·$	
+
P
	
*	 ·  ·  	 +
P
	{23}
+	 ·  ·$	
+
P
	{12}
,	 ·  ·  	 +
P
	
-	 ·  ·$	
+
P
	{13}
.	 ·   ·  	 +
P
	
/	 ·   ·$	 + 0 
where:
 is the set of indices {1 2 3 4} 
 1 is the own, direct payo generated for an individual 
when in choice problem ' she chooses alternative 	
 2 is the own, indirect payo,
 3 is the direct payo generated for the other participants,
 4 is the indirect payo generated for the other participants,
$1 is a dummy variable indicating link deletion,
$2 is a dummy variable indicating link creation,
$3 is a dummy variable indicating a central node,
i.e., with three or more direct links,
$4 is a dummy variable indicating an isolated node,
i.e., without direct links,
 is a dummy variable indicating a connected start position,
i.e., not isolated,
 is a dummy variable indicating social tradeo,
i.e., treatment social or both,
  is a dummy variable indicating value transferability,
i.e., treatment transfer or both, and
0 is a stochastic variable drawn from a standard Gumble
distribution.
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In the random parameter (1, superscript  allows for heterogeneity due
to individuals’ personal preferences as follows:
(1 = (1 + 1

1
where 11 is a stochastic variable drawn from a normal distribution. Analo-
gously, random parameters are included for the other main eects of the
payo and descriptive traits on choice, but in quest of parsimony not for the
interaction eects.
Note that in the variables, superscript  allows for heterogeneity due
to the between-subject treatment individuals participate in (e.g., in none
and social participants do not receive any indirect payos and in none and
transfer participants do not generate any payos for the other participants
in the room). Furthermore, notice that interactions between  and $1, 
and$4,  and 3,  and 4,  and 2, or  and 4 do not provide additional
information to $1, $4, 3, 4, 2, or 4, respectively, and therefore are not
included.
Then, under the usual assumptions, the unconditional probability that
individual  will choose alternative 	 equals the expected value of the logit
probability over all possible values of the random parameters. The model
is estimated by Maximum Likelihood with NLOGIT 3.0, Econometric Soft-
ware, Inc., implementing 500 Halton draws in the Monte Carlo simulation.
Finally, to investigate the impact of providing participants with an ex-
plicit payo overview, which should remove the complexity eects, a similar
model is estimated for the data with and without numerical payo informa-
tion:
  =
P
	
(	 ·  	 +
P
	
)	 ·$	
+
P
	
*	 ·  ·  	 +
P
	{23}
+	 ·  ·$	
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+
P
	{12}
,	 ·  ·  	 +
P
	
-	 ·  ·$	
+
P
	{13}
.	 ·   ·  	 +
P
	
/	 ·   ·$	
+
P
	
21	 · 3 ·  	 +
P
	
22	 · 3 ·$	
+
P
	
23	 · 3 ·  ·  	 +
P
	{23}
24	 · 3 · ·$	
+
P
	{13}
25	 · 3 ·   ·  	 +
P
	
26	 · 3 ·   ·$	 + 0 
where 3 is a dummy variable indicating by 1 that participant  was pro-
vided with payo information when solving choice problem '. Note that
interactions between 3 and  ·  or 3 and  ·$ do not provide additional
information to  ·  or  ·$, respectively, and therefore are not included.
4.4 Results
4.4.1 Some Illustrative Descriptive Results
Before turning to a more formal analysis, we rst present some illustrative
results for the choices made in the dierent conditions. Hereby the focus is
on choice problem 5 (Table 4.22).
The use of descriptive traits as proposed by Hypothesis 1 can best be
illustrated by the results under complexity condition social (second row
Table 4.2). Although changing nothing is the status quo, the rst option in
the list, and the single option that is both normatively optimal for themselves
and for the others, only 10.7% of the respective participants opts for this
alternative. However, in the second part of the experiment, when payo
information is given, thus eliminating network complexity, this proportion
grows to 53.6%. This corresponds to the use of the descriptive trait link
2Above this table with choice percentages in the dierent conditions, the respective
choice problem and its payos are replicated for the reader’s comfort.
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value transferability NO value transferability YES
you others you others
nothing 5 41.67 nothing 6.39 47.5
a 0 40 a 0 46.67
b 5 31.67 b 6.94 40.45
c 5 31.67 c 6.94 40.45
d 5 38.33 d 6.25 44.17
e 3.75 36.25 e 5 40.94
f 5 38.33 f 6.25 44.17
none / payo info NO
choice %
nothing 43.3
a 0.0
b 40.0
c 10.0
d 3.3
e 0.0
f 3.3
transfer / payo info NO
choice %
nothing 17.9
a 0.0
b 60.7
c 7.1
d 0.0
e 3.6
f 10.7
social / payo info NO
choice %
nothing 10.7
a 0.0
b 39.3
c 7.1
d 17.9
e 0.0
f 25.0
social / payo info YES
choice %
nothing 53.6
a 0.0
b 21.4
c 7.1
d 7.1
e 3.6
f 7.1
both / payo info NO
choice %
nothing 35.7
a 0.0
b 28.6
c 14.3
d 7.1
e 7.1
f 7.1
both / payo info YES
choice %
nothing 25.0
a 0.0
b 46.4
c 25.0
d 3.6
e 0.0
f 0.0
Table 4.2: Descriptive Results Choice Problem 5
creation as a choice heuristic, where creating a link is qualitatively associated
with higher payo.
In complexity condition none (rst row Table 4.2), without value trans-
ferability and social tradeo, all participants choose one of the normatively
optimal alternatives, i.e., nothing, b, c, d, or f. However, in condition trans-
fer, where value transferability is included, only 67.8% of the respective
participants choose one of the normatively optimal alternatives, i.e., b or
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c, whereas 96.4% of the choices would be optimal if only direct payo is
considered. Although causality is undecided, this pattern is in line with
Hypothesis 2.
In complexity condition social (second row Table 4.2), where social trade-
o is included, only 10.7% of the respective participants turns out to opt
for the option not to change anything, which reveals social preferences in
the sense that it maximizes the payos for the other participants, given
maximum own payo. All these participants still maximize their own payo
though. However, in the second part of the experiment, when payo infor-
mation is given, thus eliminating network complexity, 53.6% of the same
participants prefers this option. This pattern corresponds with Hypothesis
3.
In complexity condition both (third row Table 4.2), with both value
transferability and social tradeo, only 42.9% of the respective participants
chooses one of the options with optimal own payo, i.e., b or c, whereas the
rest seems to reveal social preferences in the sense that they reduce their own
payo in order to increase others’ payos. Note that 21.3% even chooses a
Pareto inferior option, i.e., a, d, e, or f, and 92.9% still maximizes their own,
direct payo. However, in the second part of the experiment, when payo
information is given, thus eliminating network complexity, the proportion
with optimal own payo increases to 71.4%. Also, only 3.6% chooses a
Pareto inferior option. These ndings further corroborate Hypotheses 2 and
3.
Further descriptive results, primarily from the debrieng part, are given
in Appendix C.
4.4.2 Mixed Logit Results
In the following subsections, a comprehensive parametric test of the hypothe-
ses is conducted by estimating a mixed logit model across all experimental
conditions for the rst part of the experiment without numerical payo infor-
mation and then a similar model including interaction eects of such payo
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information. A p-value of 0.05 is taken as cut-o value for signicance.
With Description of Choice Consequences
Table 4.3 summarizes the estimation results for the rst part of the experi-
ment in which participants were asked to make network formation decisions
based on a complete description of how the payos depend on these choices
and no numerical payo overview was provided.
variable par. est. mean est. st. dev.
(p-value) (p-value)
own direct payo 1 .33 (.00) .00 (1.0)
own indirect payo 2 -.16 (.53) .02 (.96)
others’ direct payo 3 .02 (.68) .00 (.99)
others’ indirect payo 4 -.08 (.57) .00 (.98)
link deletion 1 -1.01 (.00) .00 (1.0)
link creation 2 3.10 (.00) 1.79 (.00)
central node 3 -2.30 (.00) 1.34 (.00)
isolated node 4 2.65 (.00) .01 (.99)
connected * own direct payo  1 -.43 (.00)
connected * own indirect payo  2 1.12 (.00)
connected * others’ direct payo  3 .02 (.77)
connected * others’ indirect payo  4 .35 (.06)
connected * link creation !2 -3.16 (.00)
connected * central node !3 -2.36 (.00)
social tradeo * own direct payo "1 -.05 (.56)
social tradeo * own indirect payo "2 .72 (.03)
social tradeo * link deletion #1 -.19 (.66)
social tradeo * link creation #2 .64 (.22)
social tradeo * central node #3 .36 (.46)
social tradeo * isolated node #4 -.26 (.62)
transferability * own direct payo $1 -.20 (.01)
transferability * others’ direct payo $3 .15 (.02)
transferability * link deletion %1 .31 (.47)
transferability * link creation %2 -.44 (.39)
transferability * central node %3 2.76 (.00)
transferability * isolated node %4 -1.17 (.03)
Table 4.3: Mixed Logit Estimations Without Payo Information
We nd support for the use of descriptive traits additional to the nor-
mative payo in making decisions (Hypothesis 1): link deletion and central
node have a signicant negative eect on choice and link creation and iso-
lated node a signicant positive eect, implying that compared to doing
nothing, individuals have an aversion for deleting links and a preference for
creating links, and compared to a node with one or two links, individuals
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prefer isolated choice alternatives and dislike nodes with more links, addi-
tional to the related payo consequences.
Moreover, we nd support for Hypothesis 2, since the indirect payo does
not signicantly inuence choice, and preliminary support for Hypothesis 3,
since others’ payo does not signicantly inuence choice.
In case of a connected position for the decision maker and value transfera-
bility, the role of the own, direct payo even signicantly decreases, which
is in line with Hypotheses 4.1 and 5.1 respectively. However, the complexity
conditions do not simply strengthen the basic use of descriptive traits in all
cases: under a connected position the tendency to link creation decreases,
suggesting that individuals need the feeling of safety from the zero payo
by being connected before being able to optimize their payo, and under
value transferability respondents reverse their preference for isolated nodes
and avoidance of central nodes, suggesting that people systematically over-
estimate value transferability and therefore underestimate relative costs of
links. The data do not support Hypothesis 6.1 since under social tradeo,
there is no signicant switch from normative to descriptive traits.
Surprisingly, in case of a connected position for the decision maker, there
seems to be a switch of focus from direct to indirect payo, which contradicts
Hypothesis 4.2. The role of indirect payo is also signicantly larger in
case of social tradeo, which is the opposite interaction eect from what is
predicted by Hypothesis 6.2.
Hypothesis 4.3 is not supported by the data since there is no signicant
eect of any of the interaction terms of connected position and others’ payo.
Hypothesis 5.2 is rejected by the data since the interaction term of value
transferability and others’ payo is signicantly positive.
Respondents’ heuristic behavior signicantly varies with respect to the
preference for link creation and the avoidance of central nodes. Note that
since the own, direct payo is also included as an explanatory variable in
the choice estimation, the found heuristic eects cannot be attributed to the
selection of choice problems that participants were presented with.
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With Numerical Payo Information
The estimation results for all experimental treatments including the inter-
action eects of a comprehensive payo overview are given in Table 4.4.
With this model we nd the same support for the use of descriptive traits
(Hypotheses 1, 4.1, and 5.1) and the focus on own, direct payo (Hypotheses
2 and 3) in the case without payo information. Moreover, we again nd
the surprising eect of indirect payo in case of structural complexity of
a connected position for the decision maker and in case of social tradeo,
contradicting Hypotheses 4.2 and 6.2. Also the role of other participants’
payo is again signicantly larger in case of value transferability, which is the
opposite interaction eect from what is predicted by Hypothesis 5.2. Once
more we do not nd signicant results for the eects predicted by Hypotheses
4.3 and 6.1. Lastly, we again nd heterogeneity among participants with
respect to their preference for link creation and avoidance of central nodes.
More importantly, with this model we nd evidence for the role of payo
information indicating that substitution of the exact value of a link choice
alternative by more accessible, related heuristic attributes (particular parts
of normative traits as well as descriptive traits) is dependent on comple-
xity. Especially, the signicant positive eect of others’ payo under payo
information and a connected position for the decision maker conrms that
without payo information, participants are more inclined to be aected by
the payo consequences for other participants than actually reected in their
choices. This completes the proof for Hypothesis 3. Note that 213 and 214
are not signicant, but for Hypothesis 3 to be supported it is sucient that
233 and 234 show that numerical payo information makes a dierence.
Robustness
In this section, we check whether our estimation results are robust for several
control variables.
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variable par. est. mean (p) est. s.d. (p)
own direct payo 1 0.33 (.00) 0.00 (.97)
own indirect payo 2 -0.14 (.57) 0.01 (.98)
others’ direct payo 3 0.02 (.66) 0.00 (.97)
others’ indirect payo 4 -0.08 (.58) 0.00 (1.0)
link deletion 1 -1.00 (.00) 0.00 (.99)
link creation 2 3.01 (.00) 1.73 (.00)
central node 3 -2.39 (.00) 1.42 (.00)
isolated node 4 2.61 (.00) 0.04 (.93)
connected * own direct payo  1 -0.43 (.00)
connected * own indirect payo  2 1.11 (.00)
connected * others’ direct payo  3 0.01 (.84)
connected * others’ indirect payo  4 0.34 (.07)
connected * link creation !2 -3.02 (.00)
connected * central node !3 -2.36 (.00)
social tradeo * own direct payo "1 -0.04 (.62)
social tradeo * own indirect payo "2 0.66 (.04)
social tradeo * link deletion #1 -0.19 (.66)
social tradeo * link creation #2 0.60 (.23)
social tradeo * central node #3 0.39 (.44)
social tradeo * isolated node #4 -0.18 (.74)
transferability * own direct payo $1 -0.19 (.01)
transferability * others’ direct payo $3 0.15 (.02)
transferability * link deletion %1 0.30 (.48)
transferability * link creation %2 -0.54 (.28)
transferability * central node %3 2.81 (.00)
transferability * isolated node %4 -1.10 (.04)
payo info * own direct payo &11 0.31 (.04)
payo info * own indirect payo &12 1.65 (.03)
payo info * others’ direct payo &13 0.01 (.91)
payo info * others’ indirect payo &14 -0.03 (.91)
payo info * link deletion &21 -1.00 (.15)
payo info * link creation &22 0.20 (.87)
payo info * central node &23 -1.21 (.24)
payo info * isolated node &24 -1.54 (.04)
payo info * connected * own direct payo &31 -0.41 (.02)
payo info * connected * own indirect payo &32 -1.49 (.05)
payo info * connected * others’ direct payo &33 0.19 (.04)
payo info * connected * others’ indirect payo &34 0.72 (.02)
payo info * connected * link creation &42 -1.34 (.30)
payo info * connected * central node &43 3.12 (.04)
payo info * transferability * own direct payo &51 -0.26 (.23)
payo info * transferability * others’ direct payo &53 0.10 (.45)
payo info * transferability * link deletion &61 -0.17 (.87)
payo info * transferability * link creation &62 3.19 (.00)
payo info * transferability * central node &63 -2.99 (.03)
payo info * transferability * isolated node &64 -1.11 (.33)
Table 4.4: Mixed Logit Estimations Including Payo Information
Learning Eects First of all, the main model for all between-subject
treatments without payo information is re-estimated including the control
dummy variable experience, which tracks whether the respective participant
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at the moment of choice was solving either one of her last three problems or
one of her rst three, as an additional interaction. We nd that the beha-
vioral eects do not change and that the overall model t does not improve,
but the interactions of experience and some descriptive traits turn out to
be signicant. The respective signs of the parameter estimations are such
that the use of these heuristics is stronger for more experienced individuals,
so the behavioral eects in network formation decisions as explored in the
current chapter are not transitory.
Order Eects Next, the main model for all between-subject treatments
without payo information is re-estimated including the control dummy vari-
able primacy, which tracks whether the respective alternative was listed ei-
ther as one of the rst four or as one of the last four choice options, as an
additional choice predictor. Again we nd that the behavioral eects re-
main and that the overall model t hardly improves, whereas the respective
parameter estimate is positive and signicant.
Random Error Eects Finally, we compare our model to a simpler, more
restricted model based on the prior predictions as described in Section 4.2.1
without our behavioral eects. In line with Charness and Jackson (2006), we
add a random component to the individual decision strategy. The variance
of this random component is allowed to vary between complexity conditions.
Thus, we assume that without payo information, the utility that individual
 derives from choosing alternative 	 in choice problem ' is given by:
  = (

1 ·
¡
 1 + 

2
¢
+ (2 ·
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 3 + 

4
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+ 0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where the random parameter (1 is allowed to linearly depend on the com-
plexity conditions , , and  . This rival model turns out to perform
worse in terms of model t (i.e., the Akaike Information Criterion increases
from 3.47 to 3.84), strengthening our claim of systematic, heuristic eects
of complexity on link choice behavior.
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4.5 Discussion
4.5.1 Results
This study shows that network complexity inuences individual link choice
behavior in a systematic way, since it aects individuals’ use of heuristics in
which the normative target attribute of a link choice alternative (i.e., payo
for themselves and possibly for other individuals) is assessed by substituting
more accessible properties of that alternative. These heuristic attributes
can either be parts of the normative traits: the payo from their direct
neighbors (Hypothesis 2) and their own payo (Hypothesis 3), or descrip-
tive traits: whether a link choice alternative involves link deletion or cre-
ation and whether it concerns an isolated or a central node (Hypothesis 1).
Specically, individuals tend to neglect indirect and others’ payo whereas
they do signicantly consider their own, direct payo, they have an aversion
for deleting links and a preference for creating links, and they prefer iso-
lated choice alternatives and dislike nodes with more than two direct links,
additional to the related payo consequences. Furthermore, we nd that
complexity of one type can moderate individuals’ dealing with a complex
feature of another type. In particular, facing the structural complexity of
a connected position (Hypothesis 4.1) or facing value transferability (Hy-
pothesis 5.1), individuals tend to rely more strongly on descriptive traits. A
summary of the results is provided in Table 4.5.
Hypothesis Result
behavioral eects on network formation
1: use of descriptive traits supported
2: focus on direct payo supported
3: focus on own payo supported
moderating eects of network complexity
4: structural complexity partially supported
5: value transferability partially supported
6: social tradeo not supported
Table 4.5: Summary Experimental Results
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An explanation for the lack of support of the hypotheses related to social
tradeo is suggested by participants’ replies to the debrieng questions. It
seems that individuals consciously decide to completely neglect any payo
they generate for other people as soon as they are confronted with social
tradeo in a complex network setting. Therefore, a connected position and
value transferability are not able to still strengthen their tendency to focus
on own payo (Hypotheses 4.3 and 5.2), and it is not necessary for them to
also use other heuristics to deal with the added complexity of social tradeo
(Hypotheses 6.1 and 6.2).
The opposite eects for Hypotheses 4.2, 5.2, and 6.2 are more dicult
to account for. It might be that individuals need a trigger to realize that it
makes sense to consider payo for others, namely that value is transferred
over links (Hypothesis 5.2). Vice versa, the fact that their choices also
inuence other participants’ payo might be a trigger to make individuals
realize that indirect payo is also relevant (Hypothesis 6.2). With respect to
Hypothesis 4.2, it might be that individuals need the feeling of safety from
the zero payo by being connected before being able to consider indirect
payo as to optimize their payo.
The model estimations with inclusion of payo information conrm that
individuals’ heuristic focus on the own, direct part of the normative trait and
consideration of descriptive traits is based on the complexity of the network
setting. This is also illustrated by the descriptive statistics presented in
Section 4.4.1: the same individuals make signicantly dierent decisions in
the part of the experiment with simplifying payo information than in the
part without. In particular, this nishes the proof of Hypothesis 3, since
apparently not all insignicant eects of payo for others on choice are
simply due to a lack of social preferences.
4.5.2 Implications
The current research pioneers the issue of behavioral eects in individual
decisions of network formation. Our results should raise interest in future
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research into this realm, for they have important implications for experi-
mental research as well as application areas of network formation.
For instance, experimental research practice is often disposed to make
the payo consequences of choices as transparent as possible for partici-
pants as to prevent biased ndings due to their wrong understanding of
the instructions. However, we claim that this modies participants’ beha-
vior in a systematic way, since it eliminates complexity that they otherwise
would handle by using heuristics. As we have shown in Section 4.4.2 (page
107), these changes in behavior cannot accurately be captured by models
not explicitly allowing for behavioral eects, even if these models allow for
variations in unobserved error according to network complexity.
Furthermore, in one of the applications of network formation as men-
tioned in the introduction, word-of-mouth communication among consumers,
it matters for the supplier of the respective product or service to be aware
of behavioral eects as found in this study. For instance, consumers have a
tendency to talk with isolated peers and they neglect communication bene-
ts from beyond their direct neighbors in their communication decisions.
Also, she can exploit the nding that this heuristic behavior is dependent
on the complexity of the network environment.
One of the directions that follow-up studies could take concerns the
question in how far the complexity types and behavioral eects we considered
are specic for the network context. For example, would the tendency to
link creation have an equivalent in other choice settings? Moreover, future
experiments could generate further insights in the linking choice process
of individuals by concentrating on specic eects from the rich range of
heuristic tendencies explored here.
Chapter 5
Conclusion
This chapter concludes on the dissertation’s aim (Section 5.1) and suggests
managerial implications (Section 5.2) and directions for further research
(Section 5.3).
5.1 OCCNs: An Economic Exploration of their
Formation and Value
The topic of Online Consumer-to-Consumer Communication Networks was
studied in this dissertation, because the importance of consumers is increa-
singly recognized (C), a prevailing way in which consumers achieve this is by
communicating with other consumers (C), human behavior is aected by the
entire pattern of relationships among actors (N), and online communication
is growingly popular (O).
Communication in OCCNs is prominently characterized by informational
and social benets as well as time and eort costs for the participants.
Therefore, as illustrated in Figure 1.1, we took an economic perspective on
the underlying network formation process as a determinant of value. The
focus was on the strategic aspect, where participants choose to create links
based on a cost-benet tradeo when the eects of these choices also depend
111
112 5. Conclusion
on others’ choices, as well as on the behavioral aspect, where the complexity
of the network setting can inuence the mental decision rules that individual
participants use for link formation.
In Chapter 2, we studied the strategic aspect by introducing a game-
theoretic model of OCCN formation incorporating the mentioned characte-
ristic benets and costs. We distinguished between social and informational
value as motivations for bilateral exchange decisions, where informational
value can be transferred relatively easily to third parties through indirect
links, whereas social value is more individual and therefore not transfe-
rable. Moreover, we introduced link specicity in the communication con-
text, meaning that the more direct connections an individual has to maintain
with other individuals, the less she is able to specify her attention per link
within her total time available. Therefore, her additive value per link for
others declines and she also derives less additive value from each link with
others.
For homogeneous participants and a xed level of specicity, the model
predicts which network structures emerge dependent on the level of focus on
informational versus social value in the community. We rst characterized
the set of stable structures in the case with only social value to indicate the
separate impact of link specicity and demonstrate that it includes a wide
range of non-standard architectures. Then in the case with both social and
informational value, the joint eect of link specicity and value transferabi-
lity was shown to reduce the stable set to fragmented architectures consisting
of small star components. Finally, the best and worst stable structures from
a welfare point of view were described and the role of the relative community
focus on informational versus social value was illustrated.
Chapter 3 generalized this model as to allow for heterogeneous partici-
pants and a variable level of specicity. By simulations, we showed which
networks emerge for three levels of link specicity, three levels of focus on
informational versus social value from communication, and four valuation
patterns: homogeneity and expertise heterogeneity, each with and without
the presence of one especially highly valued expert. It was illustrated that
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the structure properties of these networks heavily depend on these parame-
ter values, which results in eciency and equity dierences among settings.
For example, we found that the eects of an expert in a community depend
on whether the rest of the community is homogeneous or not. Also, when
the informational and social aspects of communication are equally valued,
more focus on informational value turned out to be benecial for community
welfare. Finally, enhancing communication in the community by decreasing
link specicity does not always lead to higher welfare from communication.
In Chapter 4, we investigated the individual link choice process in its
behavioral aspect using experimental economics. It was demonstrated that
individuals systematically simplify more complex components of network
payo in their linking decisions. Specically, they focus on only part of
the normative payo, namely on their own, direct payo, and tend to ignore
indirect payo and payo for others in the network. Additionally, individuals
use descriptive behavioral traits of link choice alternatives to guide their
choices: they are sensitive to whether an alternative involves link deletion or
creation and whether it concerns an isolated or a central node. Furthermore,
we found that complexity of one type can moderate individuals’ dealing with
a complex feature of another type.
5.2 Managerial Implications
Our game-theoretical approach of the strategic aspect in OCCN formation
provides a framework for assessing the eectivity of several managerial tools
to aect the value that members derive from communication and therefore
indirectly also the rm’s welfare. The parameters of interest as studied are
the informational versus social orientation in the OCCN, the community’s
valuation pattern with in particular the presence or absence of an expert,
and the level of link specicity in the OCCN.
The local eciency results of Section 3.5 illustrated that in several para-
meter settings, social preferences in the sense that members use community
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welfare as their objective function rather than their own payo can enhance
welfare or equity to a consequential extent. Moreover, the experiments dis-
cussed in Chapter 4 demonstrated that people often are willing to take
others’ payo into account when making network formation decisions if only
it is clear what the payo consequences of these decisions are. Therefore,
providing more insight into this is an alternative area managers can think
of in trying to aect the welfare and equity in their community.
Also, the behavioral eects in individual decisions of OCCN formation
that we demonstrated by the use of experimental economics have important
implications for managers working in this area. For example, it matters for
a supplier of the product or service related to the OCCN to be aware of con-
sumers’ tendency to talk with isolated peers and to neglect communication
benets from beyond their direct neighbors in their communication deci-
sions. Also, a manager can exploit the nding that this heuristic behavior
is dependent on the complexity of the network environment.
5.3 Further Research
5.3.1 The Strategic Aspect
With respect to the game-theoretical approach of the strategic aspect of
OCCN formation, it is possible to derive more general analytical results
also for parameter settings that we currently have covered by simulation
studies only.
In addition, follow-up studies can investigate the eects of an agent who
is given incentives by the community manager to serve welfare rather than
own payo. Preliminary simulations indicate that this will lead to more
ecient pairwise stable networks, even if this special agent is not an ex-
pert in the sense that other community members derive more value from
communication with her.
Furthermore, more complex forms of valuation heterogeneity can be ex-
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plored. For example, the informational and social valuations could be sys-
tematically varied, resulting in dierent eects of the informational versus
social orientation in the OCCN. Also, besides expertise heterogeneity as
studied here - agents represent dierent values for their fellow customers -
it is possible to study judgement heterogeneity, where agents have dierent
opinions on the values of their fellow customers (e.g., Galeotti et al. 2006).
Preliminary simulations indicate that this leads to agent permutations rather
than structure dierences.
Another extension of the current model could be to relax the assumption
that agents divide their available eort equally among all their relationships,
thus dropping the common 1-0 formulation of links to recognize the notion
of strong and weak ties (e.g., Constant, Sproull, and Kiesler 1996).
The managerial implication practice of aecting parameters of the model
might bring up other ways of controlling the welfare and equity of OCCNs
asking for further research. Empirical testing forms an alternative promising
area: the applicability of the used payo function with diverse parameter
settings could be examined, also the strategic model could be tested ex-
perimentally, contributing to an emerging literature as surveyed by Kosfeld
(2004), and nally, the model could be orderly confronted with the rich
availability of OCCN data (e.g., Fisher et al. 2006, Holme et al. 2004).
5.3.2 The Behavioral Aspect
With respect to the experimental approach of the behavioral aspect of
OCCN formation, a general implication holds for experimental research
practice, which is often disposed to make the payo consequences of choices
as transparent as possible for participants as to prevent biased ndings due
to their wrong understanding of the instructions. However, we claim that
this modies participants’ behavior in a systematic way, since it eliminates
complexity that they otherwise would handle by using heuristics. As we
have shown in Section 4.4.2, these changes in behavior cannot accurately
be captured by models not explicitly allowing for behavioral eects, even if
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these models allow for variations in unobserved error according to network
complexity.
One of the directions that follow-up studies could take concerns the
question in how far the complexity types and behavioral eects we considered
are specic for the network context. For example, would the tendency to
link creation have an equivalent in other choice settings? Moreover, future
experiments could generate further insights in the linking choice process
of individuals by concentrating on specic eects from the rich range of
heuristic tendencies explored in Chapter 4.
Revisiting Figure 1.1 (page 8), there is one dashed arrow suggesting an
interesting further research direction. We found in the behavioral aspect
of OCCN formation that individuals systematically simplify more complex
components of network payo in their linking decisions. It could be inves-
tigated how this in turn aects the strategic OCCN formation process and
therefore the value that participants (and managers) derive from communi-
cation.
Consequently, we hope that this dissertation stimulates future research
in the appealing area of OCCNs and moreover illustrated the usefulness of
an economic approach of their formation and value.
Appendix A
Instructions
A.1 Social Tradeo? NO Value Transferabi-
lity? NO YES
In this experiment you are asked to respond to eight choice problems. You
can earn points depending on the choices you make in these problems. The
total number of points that you have at the end of the experiment determines
your monetary payo.
In each problem, you see a picture of a network in which you and several
other nodes are interconnected by links. In order to generate points, you
are allowed to change at most one link. You have the following options to
do this: (1) you can delete one link that already exists between you and any
other node, (2) you can create one link between you and any other node if
there is not yet any link between you and this node, or (3) you can choose
not to change anything.
You can determine the number of points you receive due to your choice
for a specic problem, as follows. For each node you are directly linked
with (we call such a node a neighbor) you obtain points. For each
path that links you to some other node you obtain points. However, there
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is also some cost associated with being connected: the number of points
you receive for each of your direct neighbors equals 10 divided by
two components: (i) the number of direct neighbors you have, and
(ii) the number of direct neighbors this neighbor has. the number
of points you receive for each path that links you to some other node equals
10 divided by three components: (i) the number of direct neighbors you have
in the network, (ii) the number of direct neighbors this other node has in
the network, and (iii) the square of the number of direct neighbors that any
of the further nodes on the path between you and the other node has in the
network.
[example, see Section A.3]
After each of the eight problems, the number of points that you earned
will be reported.
Note that there are no real people behind the other nodes in a network:
you are the only one able to change a link and earn points by this.
At the end of the experiment, points are exchanged for euros in the
following way: amount in euros you receive = 4 + 0.4 0.3 (total number of
points that you earned - 33.68 45.17 ).
A.2 Social Tradeo? YES Value Transferabi-
lity? NO YES
In this rst part you are asked to respond to eight choice problems. You can
earn points depending on the choices you make in these problems. Moreover,
your choices can also generate points for the other participants in the room.
The total number of points that you have at the end of the experiment
determines your monetary payo.
In each problem, you see a picture of a network in which you and several
other nodes are interconnected by links. In order to generate points, you
are allowed to change at most one link. You have the following options to
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do this: (1) you can delete one link that already exists between you and any
other node, (2) you can create one link between you and any other node if
there is not yet any link between you and this node, or (3) you can choose
not to change anything.
You can determine the number of points you receive due to your choice
for a specic problem, as follows. For each node you are directly linked
with (we call such a node a neighbor) you obtain points. For each
path that links you to some other node you obtain points. However, there
is also some cost associated with being connected: the number of points
you receive for each of your direct neighbors equals 10 divided by
two components: (i) the number of direct neighbors you have, and
(ii) the number of direct neighbors this neighbor has. the number
of points you receive for each path that links you to some other node equals
10 divided by three components: (i) the number of direct neighbors you have
in the network, (ii) the number of direct neighbors this other node has in
the network, and (iii) the square of the number of direct neighbors that any
of the further nodes on the path between you and the other node has in the
network.
[example, see Section A.3]
After each of the eight problems, the number of points that you earned
will be reported.
The other nodes in the choice problems receive points in the same way
as you do. There are no real people behind these nodes and you are the
only one able to change a link in a network. However, the points that the
other nodes receive due to your choices do have a consequence for the other
participants in this room. In fact, these points will be divided equally among
them.
[example continued, see Section A.3]
The number of points that you generated for the other participants will
also be reported after each problem.
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At the end of the experiment, points are exchanged for euros in the
following way: amount in euros you receive for this rst part = 4 + 0.06
0.07 (total number of points that you earned in this rst part - 265.51
320.63 ).
The choices you made in the rst part do not inuence the payos in this
part and the choices you will make in this part do not inuence the payos
in the previous part.
In this second part you are asked to respond to eight choice problems.
You can earn points depending on the choices you make in these problems.
Moreover, your choices can also generate points for the other participants
in the room. The total number of points that you have at the end of the
experiment determines your monetary payo.
At the end of the experiment, points are exchanged for euros in the
following way: amount in euros you receive for this second part = 0.5 +
0.03 0.035 (total number of points that you earned in this second part -
265.51 320.63 ).
A.3 Example
• Social Tradeo? NO Value Transferability? NO
For example, in the above network [Figure 4.1, page 85] you have two
direct neighbors: a and d. For neighbor a you get 10 points divided
by 2 (since you have two direct neighbors) divided by 3 (since a has
three direct neighbors). For neighbor d you get 10 points divided by
2 (since you have two direct neighbors) divided by 2 (since d has two
direct neighbors). In total you therefore receive 10/6 + 10/4 = 25/6
points in this example.
• Social Tradeo? NO Value Transferability? YES
For example, in the above network [Figure 4.1] there are two paths
between you and c. For the path via a and b you get 10 points divided
A.3. Example 121
by 2 (since you have two direct neighbors in the network) divided by 3
* 3 (since a has three direct neighbors in the network) divided by 2 *
2 (since b has two direct neighbors in the network) divided by 1 (since
c has one direct neighbor in the network). For the path via d, a, and
b you get 10 points divided by 2 (since you have two direct neighbors
in the network) divided by 2 * 2 (since d has two direct neighbors
in the network) divided by 3 * 3 (since a has three direct neighbors
in the network) divided by 2 * 2 (since b has two direct neighbors
in the network) divided by 1 (since c has one direct neighbor in the
network). In total you therefore receive 10/72 + 10/288 = 25/144
points for the paths between you and c. In the same way you get
10/36 + 10/144 points for the paths between you and b, 10/6 + 10/24
points for the paths between you and a and 10/4 + 10/36 points for
the paths between you and d. In total you therefore receive 775/144
points in this example.
• Social Tradeo? YES Value Transferability? NO
For example, in the above network [Figure 4.1] you have two direct
neighbors: a and d. For neighbor a you get 10 points divided by 2
(since you have two direct neighbors) divided by 3 (since a has three
direct neighbors). For neighbor d you get 10 points divided by 2 (since
you have two direct neighbors) divided by 2 (since d has two direct
neighbors). In total you therefore receive 10/6 + 10/4 = 25/6 points
in this example.
[continued] In the example above, node c has one direct neighbor:
b. Therefore, she receives 10 points divided by 1 (since c has one
direct neighbor) divided by 2 (since b has two direct neighbors), which
implies 5 points. In the same way, node b gets 10/2 + 10/6 = 20/3
points, node a gets 10/6 + 10/6 + 10/6 = 5 points, and node d gets
10/4 + 10/6 = 25/6 points. In total therefore 5 + 20/3 + 5 + 25/6
= 125/6 points will be divided equally among the other participants
in the room in this example.
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• Social Tradeo? YES Value Transferability? YES
For example, in the above network [Figure 4.1] there are two paths
between you and c. For the path via a and b you get 10 points divided
by 2 (since you have two direct neighbors in the network) divided by 3
* 3 (since a has three direct neighbors in the network) divided by 2 *
2 (since b has two direct neighbors in the network) divided by 1 (since
c has one direct neighbor in the network). For the path via d, a, and
b you get 10 points divided by 2 (since you have two direct neighbors
in the network) divided by 2 * 2 (since d has two direct neighbors
in the network) divided by 3 * 3 (since a has three direct neighbors
in the network) divided by 2 * 2 (since b has two direct neighbors
in the network) divided by 1 (since c has one direct neighbor in the
network). In total you therefore receive 10/72 + 10/288 = 25/144
points for the paths between you and c. In the same way you get
10/36 + 10/144 points for the paths between you and b, 10/6 + 10/24
points for the paths between you and a and 10/4 + 10/36 points for
the paths between you and d. In total you therefore receive 775/144
points in this example.
[continued] In the example above, there is one path between nodes a
and c. Therefore, c receives 10 points divided by 1 (since c has one
direct neighbor) divided by 2 * 2 (since b has two direct neighbors)
divided by 3 (since a has three direct neighbors) = 5/6 points for the
paths between her and a. In the same way c gets 10/2 points for the
path between her and b, 10/72 + 10/288 points for the paths between
her and d, and 10/72 + 10/288 points for the paths between her and
you. In total c therefore receives 445/72 points. In the same way node
b gets 10/2 + 10/6 + 10/36 + 10/144 + 10/36 + 10/144 points, node
a gets 10/12 + 10/6 + 10/6 + 10/24 + 10/6 + 10/24 points, and node
d gets 10/72 + 10/288 + 10/36 + 10/144 + 10/6 + 10/24 + 10/4 +
10/36 points. In total therefore 445/72 + 265/6 + 20/3 + 775/144 =
2995/48 points will be divided equally among the other participants
in the room in this example.
Appendix B
Choice Problems
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What do you choose?  
 
 I do nothing. This means that I earn 5 points and 15 points will be divided equally among the other participants in this room. 
 I delete the link with a. This means that I earn 0 points and 20 points will be divided equally among the other participants in this room. 
 I create a link with b. This means that I earn 5 points and 10 points will be divided equally among the other participants in this room.  
 
Figure B.1: Illustration Payo Information
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p1
   What do you choose?  
 
I do nothing. 
I delete the link with a. 
I delete the link with b.  
 
p2
What do you choose?  
 
I do nothing. 
I delete the link with a. 
I create a link with b.  
 
Table B.1: Practice Rounds
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1
What do you choose?  
 
I do nothing. 
I delete the link with a. 
I delete the link with b. 
I create a link with c. 
I create a link with d. 
I create a link with e. 
I delete the link with f.  
 
2
What do you choose?  
 
I do nothing. 
I create a link with a. 
I create a link with b. 
I create a link with c. 
I create a link with d. 
I create a link with e. 
I create a link with f.  
 
3
What do you choose?  
 
I do nothing. 
I delete the link with a. 
I create a link with b. 
I create a link with c. 
I create a link with d. 
I create a link with e. 
I create a link with f.  
 
Table B.2: Choice Problems 1 - 3
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4
What do you choose?  
 
I do nothing. 
I create a link with a. 
I create a link with b. 
I create a link with c. 
I create a link with d. 
I create a link with e. 
I create a link with f.  
 
5
What do you choose?  
 
I do nothing. 
I delete the link with a. 
I create a link with b. 
I create a link with c. 
I create a link with d. 
I create a link with e. 
I create a link with f.  
 
6
What do you choose?  
 
I do nothing. 
I create a link with a. 
I create a link with b. 
I create a link with c. 
I create a link with d. 
I create a link with e. 
I create a link with f.  
 
Table B.3: Choice Problems 4 - 6
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indirect payos: NO indirect payos: YES
1 you others you others
nothing 6.67 26.67 nothing 8.33 32.92
a 5 25 a 7.5 30.31
b 7.5 37.5 b 8.75 42.5
c 6.25 21.25 c 7.5 26.48
d 7.5 27.5 d 8.75 34.45
e 6.25 21.25 e 7.5 26.48
f 7.5 37.5 f 8.75 42.5
2 you others you others
nothing 0 33.33 nothing 0 41.25
a 5 33.33 a 6.58 41.51
b 3.33 32.22 b 5.03 39.72
c 5 33.33 c 6.58 41.51
d 5 35 d 6.25 42.5
e 2.5 32.5 e 4.06 39.14
f 3.33 32.22 f 5.03 39.72
3 you others you others
nothing 5 45 nothing 6.72 51.09
a 0 45 a 0 51.25
b 5 35 b 7.11 44
c 5 35 c 7.11 44
d 5 40 d 6.64 46.56
e 4.17 39.17 e 5.83 44.58
f 4.17 40.83 f 5.38 45.59
4 you others you others
nothing 0 27.5 nothing 0 35.31
a 5 30 a 6.05 37.15
b 2 26 b 3.5 32.7
c 5 30 c 6.05 37.15
d 5 27.5 d 6.52 35.74
e 3.33 26.67 e 4.93 34.24
f 5 30 f 6.05 37.15
5 you others you others
nothing 5 41.67 nothing 6.39 47.5
a 0 40 a 0 46.67
b 5 31.67 b 6.94 40.45
c 5 31.67 c 6.94 40.45
d 5 38.33 d 6.25 44.17
e 3.75 36.25 e 5 40.94
f 5 38.33 f 6.25 44.17
6 you others you others
nothing 0 38.33 nothing 0 43.33
a 3.33 38.89 a 4.57 43.58
b 2.5 37.5 b 3.91 42.03
c 5 40 c 6.18 44.79
d 5 33.33 d 7.5 40.83
e 5 33.33 e 7.5 40.83
f 3.33 38.89 f 4.57 43.58
Table B.4: Payos Choice Problems
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Appendix C
Descriptive Results
1. Duration: average 40,2 min., stand. dev. 14,8 min.
2. Almost all participants tried to earn as much as possible, whereas
17 subjects indicated other goals: best choices (6), fun / interest (2),
optimal own payos and not too bad payos for the others (4), optimal
own payos and minimal payos for the others (1), structural goals
(4).
3. In the rst choice problem [practice round], participants chose as fol-
lows: at random: 1, by calculation: 60, by intuition: 34, using a rule:
13, namely connect to the one with the least neighbors / shortest
paths (13), otherwise: 6, namely mix of intuition and calculation (5),
mistake in understanding instructions at rst (1).
4. Thereafter, did participants change their strategies? No: 67, for the
strategy was good or convenient and the problems were similar, yes:
47, switch (more) to calculation (12), intuition / experience (22), or
rule mentioned in descriptive 3 (11), or consider other participants
more (2).
5. In conditions social and both, did participants take into account the
points created for other participants? 36 did not, since they didn’t
think about it (4), didn’t care about it (16), didn’t know how (5) or
didn’t like the eort (11), 20 did, where they (conditionally) maximized
(=8) or minimized (=3) the points for the others, =2 participants
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seem not to understand that dividing among other participants does
not include yourself.
6. Strategies in the second part of conditions social and both: (conditio-
nally) maximizing payos for the others (25), choosing not too badly
for the others (7), (conditionally) minimizing payos for the others
(6), trying to repeat part 1 (8), unclear (10).
7. Strategic considerations in conditions social and both? No: 18, since
they didn’t think about it (7), thought that the other participants
wouldn’t care (5), the other participants are outside control (4), or it
would be too dicult (2), yes, but did not inuence choices: 9, yes,
hoping for a favorable group: 5, or expecting an unfavorable group: 2,
yes, unclear how: 22 (=5 of these seem not to understand that this
question is about the others creating points for you and not about you
creating points for the others).
8. Diculties were in the following elds: calculation: 33, choice com-
plexity: 34, instructions: 27, equivalent options: 5, none: 16.
9. Further remarks: interesting / nice: 12, want to know more about the
experiment: 10, conrming what was said before: 5, suggestions: 10.
10. Age: average 22,5 yrs., stand. dev.: 3,4 yrs.
11. Male: 48, female: 66.
12. Dutch: 40, German: 43, Chinese: 9, other: 22.
13. Faculty of Economics & Business Administration: 90, other: 24.
14. 90 participants did not participate in a similar experiment before; 24
did.
15. 112 participants would like to participate in future experiments, 2
would not.
16. In conditions social and both: 40 participants did not know any of
their fellow session participants, 12 knew one and 4 knew more.
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Nederlandse Samenvatting
(Summary in Dutch)
Communicatienetwerken onder consumenten via het internet: een
economisch onderzoek naar hun vorming en waarde
Het belang van consumenten wordt tegenwoordig steeds meer erkend.
Tijdens de afgelopen eeuw ontwikkelde de heersende bedrijfslosoe zich
van het productie-idee, dat consumenten ziet als vanzelfsprekende kopers
van het product van een bedrijf, via het verkoopidee, dat consumenten ziet
als mogelijke kopers van het product van een bedrijf die overtuigd moeten
worden, naar het marketingidee, dat consumenten ziet als individuen met
behoeften waaraan het product van een bedrijf moet voldoen. Nog recenter
worden consumenten zelfs vaak gezien als actieve partners in het produc-
tieproces van een bedrijf, aangezien zij de specialisten zijn van hun eigen
voorkeuren en - na aankoop - van het gebruiken van het product.
Een veelvoorkomende manier waarop consumenten deze actieve rol kun-
nen vervullen is door met andere consumenten te communiceren. Door er-
varingen met een product uit te wisselen, helpen consumenten niet alleen
zichzelf en elkaar, maar tegelijkertijd helpen ze het bedrijf als dat voldoende
kennisgeoriënteerd en exibel is. Het spreekt vanzelf dat consumenten door
elkaar te helpen de ondersteuningskosten van het bedrijf reduceren. Daar-
naast voorzien ze het bedrijf van insiderfeedback die nuttig is voor pro-
ductverbetering en ontwikkelen en bevorderen ze een positievere houding
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ten opzichte van het product. Welvaart van consument en bedrijf zijn in
deze context dus sterk gerelateerd.
In de sociale wetenschappen en in marketing in het bijzonder wordt er-
kend dat menselijk gedrag bestudeerd moet worden vanuit een structuur-
of netwerkperspectief. Dit omdat gedrag niet alleen beïnvloed wordt door
individuele zaken, bijvoorbeeld bedrijf, consument of huishouden, of zelfs
paren, bijvoorbeeld koper-verkoper of consument-consument, maar door het
gehele patroon van relaties onder meerdere spelers. Daarom behandelen we
in dit proefschrift het relevante onderwerp van onderlinge consumentencom-
municatie in de vorm van netwerken.
Een steeds populairdere versie van zo’n netwerk is het online consumer-
to-consumer communication network (OCCN). Via het internet zijn con-
sumenten vrijer om hun communicatiepartners te kiezen op basis van gedeel-
de interesse dan in de gewone wereld, want ze worden minder gehinderd door
bestaande kennissenstructuren. Ook is het veel eenvoudiger voor een bedrijf
om inzicht in en zelfs invloed op de communicatie onder consumenten te
verkrijgen, wat nodig is om de voordelen ervan optimaal te kunnen benut-
ten. Enkele diverse voorbeelden van OCCN’s worden geïllustreerd op de
omslag van dit boek.
Communicatie in OCCN’s wordt opvallend gekenmerkt door het feit dat
het twee verschillende categorieën van waarde en daardoor motivatie aan
deelnemers levert: informatieve waarde, die gebaseerd is op de uitwisseling
van productgerelateerde kennis, en sociale waarde, die gebaseerd is op het ge-
noegen van onderling contact. Een ander prominent kenmerk van OCCN’s,
tot nu toe grotendeels genegeerd door de wetenschappelijke literatuur, is het
feit dat er ook kosten bij komen kijken voor deelnemers, want ze moeten tijd
en moeite besteden aan het onderhouden van hun communicatieverbindin-
gen met andere leden: in de eerste helft van 2008 besteedde een gemiddelde
consument 37% van haar tijd op het internet aan communicatie, terwijl de
andere categorieën handel, inhoud en zoeken betreen.
Sinds haar recente ontstaan heeft de marketingliteratuur over dit onder-
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werp zich voornamelijk toegespitst op de vraag waarom individuen ervoor
kiezen deel te nemen en bij te dragen aan gemeenschappen op het internet
en kregen tot nu toe de bijzonderheden van deze virtuele netwerken van
persoonlijke relaties geen aandacht. Toch kunnen structuren van wie met
wie communiceert wel degelijk empirisch vastgesteld worden en hebben ze
invloed op uitkomsten zoals de mate waarin waarde over het netwerk ver-
spreid wordt en hoe die waarde onderling verdeeld wordt. Dit zijn belang-
rijke variabelen aangezien ze bepalen hoe gunstig OCCN’s zijn voor zowel
consumenten als bedrijven.
De wetenschappelijke discipline economie bestudeert menselijke keuzen
met betrekking tot schaarse zaken als middelen om doelen te bereiken. Zoals
eerder vermeld is onderlinge consumentencommunicatie kostbaar (schaarste)
en haar structuur is in belangrijke mate bepalend voor haar waarde (doel),
dus keuzen van consumenten met betrekking tot het vormen van een com-
municatienetwerk passen perfect in het economische vakgebied. Aangezien
marketing een multidisciplinaire wetenschap is die haar theorieën over con-
sumentengedrag baseert op sociologie, antropologie, losoe, psychologie
en economie, is het opvallend dat de economische benadering van OCCN-
vorming klaarblijkelijk ontbreekt in de bestaande marketingliteratuur.
Het huidige proefschrift heeft als doel dit gat te dichten door een econo-
misch onderzoek naar de vorming en waarde van OCCN’s te beginnen. Hier-
voor spitsen we ons toe op twee verschillende, maar sterk onderling verweven
aspecten: (i) het strategische aspect, waarbij deelnemers ervoor kiezen op
basis van een afweging van kosten en baten verbindingen te maken wanneer
de gevolgen hiervan mede afhangen van de keuzen van anderen, en (ii) het
gedragsaspect, waarbij de complexiteit van de netwerkomgeving van invloed
kan zijn op de mentale beslisregels die individuele deelnemers gebruiken bij
hun verbindingskeuzen.
Om het netwerkvormingsproces in haar strategische aspect te modelleren
gebruiken we het economische gereedschap bij uitstek om strategische in-
teracties te bestuderen, namelijk de speltheorie. Deze subdiscipline beoogt
situaties waarin besluitvormers hun keuzen vrij kunnen baseren op de kosten
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en baten van de alternatieven, die mede afhankelijk zijn van de keuzen
van andere besluitvormers, wiskundig te vatten. Recentelijk ontwikkelt
zich een speltheoretische literatuurstroom die zich toespitst op netwerkvor-
ming, opgevat als een proces waarin individuen ervoor kiezen verbindingen
te leggen en te onderhouden als de deelnemers aan de verbinding daar baat
bij hebben, wat resulteert in een stabiele netwerkstructuur. Hoewel deze
modellen zeer geschikt zijn om toe te passen op een internetomgeving, is dit
nog niet eerder gedaan.
Voor deze toepassing nemen we de genoemde kosten- en batengerela-
teerde kenmerken van OCCN’s op in ons speltheoretische model van netwerk-
vorming. We maken als eersten onderscheid tussen sociale en informatieve
waarde als motivatie voor bilaterale uitwisselingsbeslissingen, waarbij infor-
matieve waarde relatief eenvoudig via indirecte verbindingen aan derden kan
worden doorgegeven, terwijl sociale waarde individueler is en daarom niet
doorgeefbaar. Bovendien introduceren we verbindingsspeciciteit in de com-
municatiecontext, wat inhoudt dat hoe meer directe connecties met anderen
een individu moet onderhouden, hoe minder ze in staat is haar aandacht per
verbinding te speciceren binnen de haar beschikbare tijd. Daarom neemt
haar toegevoegde waarde per verbinding voor anderen af en ontleent ze ook
zelf minder toegevoegde waarde aan elke verbinding met anderen.
Ons speltheoretische model wordt gepresenteerd in Hoofdstuk 2 van dit
proefschrift. Voor homogene deelnemers en een vaste mate van verbin-
dingsspeciciteit voorspelt het model welke netwerkstructuren ontstaan af-
hankelijk van de mate van concentratie op informatieve versus sociale waarde
in de gemeenschap. Om de afzonderlijke gevolgen van verbindingsspeci-
citeit aan te geven, karakteriseren we eerst de verzameling stabiele struc-
turen voor het geval met alleen sociale waarde en tonen aan dat die een
grote verscheidenheid aan niet-standaard architecturen omvat. Vervolgens
laten we zien dat in het geval met zowel sociale als informatieve waarde,
het gezamenlijke eect van verbindingsspeciciteit en doorgeefbaarheid van
waarde de stabiele verzameling reduceert tot gefragmenteerde architecturen
die uit kleine stervormige componenten bestaan. Tenslotte worden de sta-
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biele structuren omschreven die het beste en slechtste zijn vanuit een wel-
vaartsperspectief en wordt de rol van de relatieve gemeenschapsconcentratie
op informatieve versus sociale waarde geïllustreerd.
In Hoofdstuk 3 wordt het model gegeneraliseerd zodat het heterogene
deelnemers en een variabele mate van verbindingsspeciciteit toestaat. Aan
de hand van simulaties laten we zien welke netwerken ontstaan bij drie
niveaus van verbindingsspeciciteit, drie niveaus van concentratie op infor-
matieve versus sociale waarde van communicatie en vier onderlinge waarde-
ringspatronen: homogeniteit en expertise-heterogeniteit, elk met en zon-
der de aanwezigheid van een bijzonder hooggewaardeerde expert. Er wordt
getoond dat de structuureigenschappen van deze netwerken sterk afhangen
van deze parameterwaarden, wat resulteert in eciëntie- en gelijkmatigheid-
verschillen tussen situaties. Hiermee beoordelen we de eectiviteit van ver-
scheidene managementgereedschappen voor OCCN’s.
Om het individuele verbindingskeuzeproces in haar gedragsaspect te on-
derzoeken, gebruiken we een benadering vanuit de experimentele economie.
Deze tak onderzoekt keuzen door ze mensen in een gecontroleerde labora-
toriumomgeving te laten maken, waarbij de gevolgen van deze keuzen in
geld aan de deelnemers uitbetaald worden. Er bestaat recente en groeiende
literatuur waarin wetenschappers het netwerkvormingsproces experimenteel
onderzoeken. Deze studies houden zich allemaal bezig met het strategi-
sche aspect van netwerkvorming, terwijl wij dit aspect uitsluiten om het
gedragsaspect beter te kunnen bestuderen, aangezien de eecten van beide
aspecten onderling verward kunnen zijn.
Om onze vraag hoe de complexiteit van de netwerkomgeving de men-
tale beslisregels kan beïnvloeden die deelnemers bij verbindingsvorming ge-
bruiken te beantwoorden, combineren we de experimenteel-economische be-
nadering met een modellering van individuele keuzen zoals bekend van de
discipline keuzeanalyse. Hierdoor kunnen we de gevolgen van belangrijke
netwerkeigenschappen op beslissingen onderzoeken zonder sterke aannamen
te hoeven maken over de strategische wisselwerking tussen heterogene, fout-
gevoelige besluitvormers.
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Hoofdstuk 4 beschrijft ons experiment met haar resultaten en toont aan
dat individuen gecompliceerdere onderdelen van netwerkuitbetaling syste-
matisch vereenvoudigen in hun verbindingsbeslissingen. In het bijzonder
concentreren ze zich slechts op een gedeelte van de normatieve uitbetaling,
namelijk op hun eigen, directe uitbetaling, en neigen naar het verwaar-
lozen van indirecte uitbetaling en uitbetaling voor anderen in het netwerk.
Daarnaast gebruiken individuen beschrijvende gedragskenmerken van alter-
natieven om hun verbindingskeuzen op te baseren: ze zijn er gevoelig voor
of een alternatief gaat om het verbreken of juist vormen van een verbinding
en of het een geïsoleerd of een centraal iemand betreft. Verder ontdekken
we dat complexiteit van een bepaald type de manier waarop individuen om-
gaan met een complexe eigenschap van een ander type beïnvloedt. Deze
gedragseecten hebben belangrijke implicaties voor onderzoekers en mana-
gers die te maken hebben met netwerkvorming.
Curriculum Vitae
Marjolein J.W. Harmsen - van Hout was born on April 29th 1979 in Raven-
stein, The Netherlands. After completing a Gymnasium-bèta education at
the St.-Janscollege in Hoensbroek (Heerlen) in 1997, she studied Econome-
trics (specializations Econometrics and Mathematical Economics) and Eco-
nomics (specialization International Competition Policy) at the Faculty of
Economics and Business Administration of Maastricht University and gra-
duated for both on April 29th 2003. Her nal thesis was titled “Networks:
Formation Models and Eciency Issues”. From May 1st 2003 Marjolein
worked on her PhD project about Consumer Communication Networks at
the Department of Marketing of the same university and was supervised
by prof. dr. ir. Benedict G.C. Dellaert (Erasmus University Rotterdam)
and prof. dr. P. Jean-Jacques Herings (Department of Economics). Since
October 27th 2008 she has been proceeding as a post-doctoral researcher
with the institute of Future Energy Consumer Needs and Behavior at the
Faculty of Business and Economics and the E.ON Energy Research Center
of RWTH Aachen University, Germany. Marjolein is married and lives in
Simpelveld, The Netherlands.
145
